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Abstract 
 
I study the evolution of SFAS 142, which uses unverifiable fair-value estimates to 
account for acquired goodwill. I find evidence consistent with the FASB issuing SFAS 
142 in response to political pressure over its proposal to abolish pooling accounting: pro-
poolers can be linked—via political contributions—to Congresspersons pressuring the 
FASB on this issue. This result is interesting given the proposal to abolish pooling was 
due in part to SEC concerns over pooling misuse. I also find evidence consistent with 
lobbying support for SFAS 142 increasing in firms’ ability to use discretion under the 
standard. Agency theory suggests firms use this discretion opportunistically. The results 
highlight the potential costs of unverifiable fair-value accounting. 
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1. Introduction 
“Fair-value accounting” is the practice of reporting assets and liabilities at their 
current fair values. It has been used in several GAAP standards in recent years.
1 
Holthausen and Watts (2001) argue that fair values, when not based on actively traded 
market prices, i.e., when unverifiable, can increase opportunism. I test this argument 
through a political-economy study of a recent prominent standard that uses unverifiable 
fair values: SFAS 142, accounting for acquired goodwill. I find evidence consistent with 
SFAS 142 being at least partly due to lobbying by firms that now, under the standard, 
enjoy potential for opportunism.
2  
SFAS 142 resulted from the FASB’s project to revise business combinations 
accounting.
3 The FASB (1998, pp. 5–6) cited “flaws,” “deficiencies,” and “abuses” of 
pooling accounting among its reasons for revising business combinations accounting. It 
also cited SEC concerns about pooling misuse: SEC Chief Accountant Turner (1999) 
complained that he often saw pooling transactions that “clearly [did] not meet the spirit or 
the intention of [pooling rules].” Initially, the FASB proposed eliminating pooling and 
requiring all firms to use the purchase method, with amortization required for all acquired 
goodwill (FASB 1999). This proposal met with strong opposition among lobbying firms: 
some members of Congress also joined the opposition (U.S. House 2000, U.S. Senate 
2000). The FASB revised its original proposal: it continued to advocate eliminating 
pooling and requiring purchase, but now proposed, in lieu of amortization, goodwill 
“impairment” based on unverifiable fair-value estimates of goodwill’s extant value 
(FASB 2001a). This revised proposal, with few changes, was quickly incorporated into 
the new business combinations standards: SFAS 141 and 142 (FASB 2001b, c). 
I find that Congresspersons opposed to the FASB’s original abolish-pooling 
proposal can be linked—using political contributions—to firms opposed to that proposal, 
i.e., pro-poolers. I also find these pro poolers are among those who proposed the 
“revised” impairment rules now in SFAS 142. The evidence is consistent with pro-
                                                 
1 Examples of accounting standards that use fair values include: impairment of long-lived assets (SFAS 121 
in 1995 and SFAS 144 in 2001), employee stock options (SFAS 123 in 1995 and SFAS 123R in 2005), 
derivatives and hedging (SFAS 133 in 1998), and acquired goodwill (SFAS 142 in 2001). 
2 Throughout the paper, I assume that managers are responsible for firm decisions: if managers’ incentives 
are not perfectly aligned with those of shareholders, firm decisions will reflect managers’ interests. 
3 See Appendix 1 for a quick review of business combinations accounting.    2
poolers being at least partly responsible for the outcome of the FASB’s business 
combinations project.  
If the FASB and the SEC are correct about pooling being abused, and if abusers 
are among pro-poolers, from the evidence above, it is likely that potential for 
opportunism has been retained in SFAS 142. To test this, I investigate whether discretion 
potential explains firms’ lobbying support for the SFAS 142 impairment rules. Agency 
theory suggests such discretion can be used opportunistically.
4 From the SFAS 142 
impairment rules, I identify three firm characteristics that increase the probability of 
discretion: (1) larger and more numerous business units; (2) higher market-to-book 
(MTB) ratios; and (3) higher proportions of net assets without observable market values.  
(1) Under SFAS 142, goodwill recognized in an acquisition must be allocated 
across the acquirer’s business units based on fair-value estimates of how that 
goodwill will be realized. Acquired goodwill usually represents rents expected by 
the acquirer. If such rents are generated by the acquirers’ units in common, their 
allocation across units involves separating joint benefits. Thus, the allocation is 
arbitrary and unverifiable (Watts 2003, Roychowdhury and Watts 2007). Ceteris 
paribus, the larger and more numerous an acquirer’s business units, the greater 
the acquirer’ flexibility in allocating goodwill, and thus, the greater its discretion 
in determining future impairments. 
(2) After acquired goodwill is allocated to business units, acquirers must 
periodically evaluate whether it is impaired. SFAS 142 requires such impairment 
testing only for business units with fair-value-to-book-value (FTB) ratios less than 
one. This rule implicitly assumes that all of the excess of a unit’s fair value over 
its book value is due to acquired goodwill: internally generated rents and the 
understatement of book value are not accounted for at this step. Ceteris paribus, 
units with high FTB ratios can absorb losses to acquired goodwill, giving them 
greater discretion to avoid future impairments. Since units’ FTB ratios are 
unobservable, I use firm-wide MTB ratios as a proxy.  
(3) For units with FTB ratios less than one, SFAS 142 requires recording 
                                                 
4 Managers may avoid opportunism due to its reputational costs. Contracts are unlikely to prevent 
opportunism since unverifiable estimates are difficult to challenge ex post.    3
impairment losses when the extant value of goodwill is less than its historical 
book value. Since there is no observable market price for goodwill, the extant 
value of a unit’s goodwill is calculated as the difference between the unit’s total 
fair-value and the fair value of its non-goodwill net assets. In a firm, fair values of 
some net assets (e.g., cash, investments, payables, etc.) can be verified more 
readily than the fair values of others (e.g., firm-specific assets such as specialized 
plant and equipment). Ceteris paribus, the greater the proportion of unverifiable 
net assets, the greater the flexibility in estimating the current value of net assets 
and goodwill, and thus, the greater the discretion in determining impairments. 
  
I find that firms with the three financial characteristics above are more likely 
(than other firms) to lobby for impairment in SFAS 142. This result is consistent with 
discretion potential motivating firms’ support for impairment. If lobbying motives 
indicate how firms will apply standards, then from agency theory we can expect at least 
some firms to use their discretion opportunistically. Thus, the result suggests that at least 
in some lobbying firms, unverifiable fair values in SFAS 142 impairment generate costs. 
Two recent association studies on SFAS 142 (Chen et al. 2004, Li et al. 2005), 
however, conclude that the standard is “net beneficial.” These association studies base 
their conclusions on finding negative correlations between SFAS 142 impairments and 
stock returns. The studies attribute the negative correlations to the standard’s 
“effectiveness”—SFAS 142 provides managers with a framework to convey private 
future-cash-flow information to markets. This interpretation and the “net beneficial” 
conclusion are likely premature for at least two reasons. 
First, negative correlations between impairments and market returns are also 
consistent with other plausible explanations. For example, markets can react negatively to 
impairments because: (a) impairments are “big baths,” or (b) impairments indicate 
management’s inability to avoid losses despite SFAS 142’s discretion potential. In both 
cases, the impairments are informative to markets, but not because the standard has 
provided a framework for managers to reliably report private information. Second, 
association studies do not explain the determinants of impairment decisions. The studies 
are focused on explaining recorded impairments; firms avoiding impairments are not   4
considered. Without an investigation of the extent and causes of impairment avoidance, it 
is difficult to make conclusions on the “net benefits” of SFAS 142.
5   
Given the limitations of the above studies, I argue this paper generates new 
evidence on SFAS 142’s costs. There are, however, some alternate interpretations of the 
evidence. First, it can be argued that pooling is the optimal method to account for 
business combinations, and so, on average, pro-poolers will not use SFAS 142 discretion 
opportunistically. The argument for pooling is that it does not record acquired rents as 
assets. Ely and Waymire (1999) find evidence in pre-SEC accounting practices consistent 
with non-capitalization of intangibles being optimal for financial reporting. However, 
under pooling, even verifiable assets and liabilities are not written up to current values. 
This is inconsistent with common practice pre-SEC (Fabricant 1936). Assuming pre-
regulatory accounting practice evolved in equilibrium, the non-recognition of changes in 
verifiable net-asset values under pooling is an argument against the method. Thus, it is 
not clear that pooling is optimal.   
Second, one can argue that firms’ “support” for SFAS 142 impairment rules is 
really just support for purchase accounting over pooling: the writing-up of verifiable 
assets and liabilities under purchase makes financial statements more informative. This 
argument, however, cannot explain why firms’ lobbying support for purchase increases 
systematically with discretion potential under goodwill impairment rules. Further, most 
firms did not choose purchase over pooling when the FASB initially offered purchase 
with goodwill amortization; majority firm-support for purchase only came after 
unverifiable impairment rules replaced goodwill amortization.  
Third, it can be argued that pro-pooling firms supported impairment rules not for 
greater discretion, but simply because it offered an alternative to amortization. Like the 
previous claim, this argument cannot explain why firms’ lobbying support for impairment 
increases systematically in discretion potential. Another reason this argument is unlikely 
to be valid is that the specific impairment rules now in SFAS 142 closely resemble those 
advanced by pro-poolers lobbying on the revised proposal (details discussed in §3).  
                                                 
5 For example, Ramanna and Watts (2006) find 189 firms with non-zero book goodwill that had MTB>1 in 
2001 (the year of SFAS 142) and MTB<1 in 2002, but that took no write-offs in 2002. These 189 firms are 
over 60% of Li et al.’s (2005) entire association test sample of 313 firms. If MTB<1 is an indication of 
impaired goodwill, this finding suggests firms are able to avoid write-offs post SFAS 142.    5
Finally, one can argue that since SFAS 142 impairment is an application of the 
lower-of-cost-and-market (LCM) principle, this paper simply highlights the costs of 
LCM (and is not informative of unverifiable fair values). This argument overlooks an 
important point: in the SFAS 142 application of LCM, “market” values are not used to 
determine impairment; instead, unverifiable fair-value estimates of goodwill are used. 
Thus, conclusions from this paper on the costs of LCM are inappropriate. 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the events 
leading up to SFAS 142. Section 3 develops two hypotheses: the first to test whether 
SFAS 142 goodwill impairment is due in part to pro-pooling firms; the second to test 
whether discretion potential explains firms’ support for goodwill impairment. Section 4 
describes the research design, univariate and multivariate tests of both hypotheses, and 
robustness results. Section 5 concludes. 
 
2. Background to SFAS 142 
Prior to SFAS 141 and 142, GAAP had two methods to account for business 
combinations: purchase and pooling. Purchase required capitalizing and then amortizing 
acquired goodwill; pooling required neither. Firms were expected to use purchase unless 
they met certain statutory criteria—established in APB Opinion 16—to qualify for 
pooling (AICPA 1970). Pooling’s more favorable impact on income statements meant 
that certain firms engineered deals to qualify for pooling.
6 Firms unable or unwilling to 
engineer deals had to report amortization costs under the purchase method. This led to 
situations where “two transactions that [were] not significantly different [could] be 
accounted for by methods that produce[d] dramatically different financial statement 
results (FASB 1999, p. 34).” In the late 90’s, perhaps in response to increasing merger 
activity, the SEC openly expressed its concern on pooling abuse. SEC Chief Accountant 
Lynn Turner (1999) noted that he often saw pooling transactions that “clearly [did] not 
meet the spirit or the intention of [APB 16].” SEC Deputy Chief Accountant Jane Adams 
(1997) called the practice that had evolved around APB 16 a “quagmire,” and remarked 
that “[a]n incredible amount of resources of preparers, practitioners, standards setters and 
                                                 
6 For example, Lys and Vincent (1995) estimate that AT&T paid between $50 million and $500 million to 
qualify for pooling in its acquisition of NCR.    6
regulators [was] consumed daily by APB 16…”  
Due in part to this SEC concern, in September 1999, the FASB issued Exposure 
Draft (ED) #201 on business combinations and intangibles.
7 The ED proposed 
eliminating pooling, and requiring all business combinations to use the purchase method. 
Under purchase, acquired goodwill was to be amortized, with the maximum amortization 
period reduced from 40 to 20 years.  
ED 201 provided for a 90-day comment period: over 200 comment letters were 
filed. About 60% of corporate respondents to the ED opposed abolishing pooling. The 
debate over pooling quickly reached Congress. In March and May of 2000, the Senate 
Banking Committee and the House Finance Subcommittee, respectively, held hearings on 
the issue. Many of the firms and industry associations that had already expressed their 
opposition to ED 201 (through comment letters and/or testimonials at FASB’s hearings) 
testified at the Congressional hearings. In fact, apart from the FASB itself, there were no 
supporters of ED 201 at the Senate hearings. Most Congresspersons at both hearings 
urged the FASB to either reconsider its decision on pooling, or propose alternate ways to 
account for goodwill and intangibles.
8  
In October 2000, several members of the House introduced a bill, H.R. 5365, the 
“Financial Accounting for Intangibles Reexamination Act.” The stated purpose of the bill 
was to “impose a moratorium on the elimination of … pooling” until a Congressionally 
appointed commission reported on the economic impact of eliminating pooling and on 
methods to better account for intangible assets. Also in October 2000, a bipartisan group 
of thirteen U.S. Senators wrote the FASB expressing “reservations” over the FASB’s 
plan to eliminate pooling. The letter asked the FASB to “take no conclusive action” on 
the business combinations project until Congress “had the opportunity to review the 
economic impact of the FASB’s plans (Abraham 2000, pp. 1-2).”  
Over this period, the idea of an impairment-only approach to goodwill was 
proposed to the FASB. First, in May 2000 (shortly after the House hearings), the FASB 
heard from representatives of Morgan Stanley Dean Witter, Goldman Sachs, Deloitte and 
Touche, PriceWaterhouseCoopers, Arthur Andersen, and Columbia Business School. 
                                                 
7 The FASB (1999) also cited “international convergence” as a reason for the ED. 
8 A few Congresspersons, however, did express concerns over the hearings because they built precedent for 
future Congressional intervention in accounting standards setting (U.S. House 2000, U.S. Senate 2000).    7
Later, in September 2000, the FASB heard from another team from the American 
Business Conference, Cisco, Merrill Lynch, TechNet and UPS. Both groups discussed 
the merits of implementing an impairment-only test for goodwill. In February 2001, the 
FASB unanimously issued a revised ED (#201-R) that proposed replacing goodwill 
amortization with the impairment-only approach. Notably, however, ED 201-R did not 
change the FASB’s stance on abolishing pooling. 
ED 201-R detailed the following procedure for goodwill accounting: (1) goodwill 
from an acquisition is initially allocated among the “reporting units” of a firm based on 
fair-value estimates of how that goodwill will be realized across those units;
9 (2) in 
subsequent periods, goodwill is tested for impairment at this reporting unit level; (3) a 
reporting unit’s goodwill is considered impaired if the goodwill’s “implied fair value” is 
less than the goodwill’s book value; (3) the goodwill’s “implied fair value” is the excess 
of the reporting unit’s total fair value over the fair value of the unit’s non-goodwill net 
assets; and (4) goodwill impairment losses from various reporting units in a firm are 
aggregated and presented as a separate above-the-line item.  
Over 200 comment letters were received on ED 201-R. This revised proposal 
(abolish pooling, impair goodwill) was considerably more popular than the original one 
(abolish pooling, amortize goodwill). About 70% of corporate respondents to ED 201-R 
supported the impairment-only approach. Although the FASB had left its decision on 
abolishing pooling intact, there was little mention of the pooling issue in firms’ comment 
letters (only 14% of corporate respondents on ED 201-R expressed support for pooling). 
Congressional interest in retaining pooling also waned: there were no comment letters by 
Congresspersons on ED 201-R.  
In June 2001, the board issued its final business combinations standards—SFAS 
141 and 142. The former abolished pooling in favor of purchase. The latter introduced 
impairment-only accounting for goodwill. The goodwill impairment method in SFAS 142 
adds an important additional step to the procedure detailed in ED 201-R. In the ED, a 
reporting unit’s goodwill is impaired if the goodwill’s implied fair value is less than the 
goodwill’s book value. In the final standard, this impairment test is performed only if the 
                                                 
9 Generally, a reporting unit is an operating segment or a component thereof if that component constitutes a 
business with discrete financial information that is regularly reviewed by management (FASB 2001a).    8
reporting unit’s total fair value is less than the reporting unit’s book value (i.e. only if the 
reporting unit’s fair-value to book-value ratio is less than one).   
 
3. Hypotheses Development
10 
3.1. Is Goodwill Impairment in SFAS 142 due in part to Pro-poolers? 
  The sequence of events leading up to SFAS 142 suggests unverifiable fair-value-
based goodwill impairment is due, at least in part, to pro-poolers (i.e., supporters of 
pooling on the original ED). Almost all Congressional pressure on the FASB over its 
business-combinations ED was in support of pro-poolers’ interests. Those few 
Congresspersons who did not actively make the pro-poolers’ case did not support the 
FASB’s position either: they only expressed concern over the dangers of Congressional 
involvement in accounting standard setting. That goodwill impairment is likely due to 
pressure on the FASB by pro-poolers has been suggested before (Michaels and Larsen, 
Financial Times 2000; Weil, Wall Street Journal 2000). However, no systematic 
evidence to this effect has been presented so far. In this sub-section, I develop two 
testable hypotheses to determine if there is a link between pro-poolers and goodwill 
impairment. 
Congressional hearings on accounting standards are “relatively infrequent;” 
however, as former FASB Chair Dennis Beresford (2001, p. 74) notes, such hearings are 
taken “very seriously” by the board. If the FASB is concerned about its long-term 
survival, it likely heeds Congressional pressure when exerted. There is precedent for the 
dissolution of accounting standard-setting bodies in the face of political pressure: Zeff 
(2005) notes how persistent industry lobbying against the APB eventually led to its 
demise. Thus, it is likely that the FASB took the pressure from Congresspersons against 
its initial business-combinations proposal (abolish pooling, amortize goodwill) seriously.  
The purpose of my first hypothesis is to test if there is a link between those 
Congresspersons who became involved in the pooling issue and the firms and industry 
groups opposing abolishing pooling (i.e., pro-poolers). The idea is to test whether these 
pro-pooling firms and industry groups used their allies in Congress to pressure the FASB 
to rethink its original proposal (abolish pooling, amortize goodwill). I identify 
                                                 
10 Table 1 summarizes all hypotheses; Figure 1 locates them in the timeline of events leading to SFAS 142.   9
Congresspersons pressuring the FASB over pooling as those who were involved against 
the board in at least one of the following events: (1) the March 2000 Senate hearings; (2) 
the May 2000 House hearings; (3) the October 2000 House bill to create a federal 
commission on intangibles accounting; and (4) the October 2000 Senate letter seeking a 
moratorium on the FASB’s original proposal. 
I use PAC (Political Action Committee) contributions to link Congresspersons to 
pro-pooling firms and industry groups. I use PAC money although it represents only one 
component of Congresspersons’ total political receipts because the other major sources of 
money (viz., soft money and direct lobbying money) cannot be directly traced from 
source firms/organizations to Congresspersons. Moreover, Ansolabehere et al. (2002) 
show that PAC money from non-ideological PACs (like corporations) is likely followed 
up by direct lobbying money. Further, as Snyder (1992) points out, virtually all scholarly 
work relating corporations with Congressional decisions focuses on PAC contributions. I 
hypothesize that the likelihood of a Congressperson self-selecting into pressuring the 
FASB over pooling is increasing in PAC contributions received from firms and industry 
groups that opposed the FASB’s pooling decision. It is important to note that this does 
not suggest that PAC contributions were used to buy Congressional positions solely on 
pooling. It is widely held in political science that firms’ relations with Congresspersons 
are developed over long periods, and that firms likely give to Congresspersons who are 
already predisposed to supporting them (i.e., PAC giving is likely endogenous). Thus, 
PAC contributions can be used to establish donors’ association with, but not causality of, 
specific Congressional decisions.  
[H1a] The probability of a Congressperson pressuring the FASB over pooling is 
increasing in PAC contributions received from firms and industry groups that 
opposed the FASB’s original proposal (abolish pooling and require goodwill 
amortization). 
 
While the null to H1a may seem benign at first, establishing this result is an 
important step in tracing the political history of SFAS 142 goodwill impairment. Every 
member of Congress could potentially have become involved in the pooling debate; 
however, only certain members did. While the news media has suggested that these 
members did so at the behest of pro-pooling groups, it is also possible that these members   10
did so solely due to their ideology and/or their memberships on relevant Congressional 
committees (i.e., House Finance Subcommittee and Senate Banking Committee). Tests of 
H1a control for these alternate possibilities.  
Evidence consistent with the H1a will suggest that pro-poolers were associated 
with Congressional pressure against the FASB’s original proposal. This proposal was 
replaced by one requiring unverifiable fair-value-based goodwill impairment in lieu of 
goodwill amortization. The revised proposal, with few changes, quickly became the final 
standard. Given Congress’ support for pro-poolers, it is likely that the final standard 
reflected pro-poolers’ interests. In other words, the politically connected pro-poolers are 
unlikely to have let a proposal become the final standard if they did not support it. H1b 
tests this proposition. Together, H1a and H1b provide evidence as to whether pro-poolers 
are at least partly responsible for goodwill impairment in SFAS 142.  
[H1b] Firms opposing the FASB’s original proposal (abolish pooling and require 
goodwill amortization) are more likely to support the final impairment standards 
in SFAS 142.  
 
3.2. Does Discretion Potential Explain Firms’ Support for Goodwill Impairment? 
As noted earlier, the proposal to abolish pooling and require purchase was due in 
part to FASB and SEC concerns over pooling abuse. If the FASB and SEC are correct 
about pooling being abused, and if abusers are among the pro-poolers predicted in H1 to 
have influenced the final impairment rules in SFAS 142, it is likely that potential for 
abuse has been retained in those rules. To test this, I test whether discretion potential 
explains firms’ lobbying support for the SFAS 142 impairment rules. The discretion 
potential arises due to the rules’ reliance on unverifiable fair-value estimates. Agency 
theory suggests such discretion potential can be used opportunistically.  
The significance of discretion potential under SFAS 142 impairment rules 
increases in both the probability of managing impairments and the magnitude of 
impairments that can be managed. I identify three firm characteristics that increase the 
probability of managing impairments (developed in H2a–H2c) and one firm characteristic 
that measures the magnitude of impairments that can be managed (H2d). I test whether 
lobbying positions on the FASB’s revised ED (201-R, which proposed the impairment-
only approach to goodwill) vary with these four firm characteristics.    11
There are three firm lobbying positions on ED 201-R. The first position is anti-
impairment: I call this the Amortization Position since firms supporting this position 
(about 28% of lobbyists) wanted the practice of amortization to continue. The other two 
positions are both pro-impairment. The first, the Revised ED Position (supported by 
about 38% of lobbyists) is that adopted by pro-impairment firms who also supported the 
impairment rules as proposed in ED 201-R. The second, the Comment Letter Position 
(supported by about 34% of lobbyists) is that adopted by pro-impairment firms proposing 
an alternate impairment test to that in ED 201-R. This is explained below. 
In ED 201-R, impairments are recognized when the “implied fair value” of a 
reporting unit’s goodwill is less than its book value. The ED defines the “implied fair 
value” of goodwill the excess of the unit’s total fair value over the fair value of its 
constituent net assets. Comment Letter Position firms objected to the costs of assessing 
the fair values of reporting units’ net assets each time an impairment test was 
necessitated. As an alternative, they proposed tests based on the book values of those net 
assets (see Figure 2 to contrast the Revised ED and Comment Letter Positions).  
Note that in the final standard, goodwill impairment is recognized only when the 
total fair value of a reporting unit is less than its book value. Thus, the Comment Letter 
Position (so named because it originated in firms’ comment letters) most closely 
resembles the final impairment rules in SFAS 142. Accordingly, the hypotheses that 
follow are structured to test whether discretion-measuring firm characteristics determine 
a firm’s choice of the Comment Letter Position over the two other positions. This 
arrangement facilitates interpretation of the results.  
 
3.2.1. The Number and Size of Reporting Units 
Under SFAS 142, a firm recognizing goodwill in an acquisition must allocate that 
goodwill among its reporting units based on fair-value estimates of how that goodwill 
will be realized. Assuming appropriate valuation of an acquired firm and its net assets, 
goodwill from an acquisition represents rents expected by the acquiring firm. If such 
rents are generated by the acquiring firm’s units in common, their allocation across units 
involves separating joint benefits: any allocation is arbitrary and unverifiable (Watts 
2003, Roychowdhury and Watts 2007).  For an acquiring firm, the larger the number of   12
reporting units, the greater the flexibility in initially allocating goodwill; also, the larger 
the size of a unit relative to acquired goodwill, the more likely subsequent values of 
acquired goodwill will be masked by the unit’s internally generated gains/losses. 
Acquiring firms with several large reporting units can choose to allocate goodwill either 
to low growth units to accelerate impairment (big bath), or to high growth units (with 
existing unrecorded internally generated growth options) to delay impairment.  
If this ability to manage future impairments motivated lobbying, I expect firms 
with several large reporting units to support the Comment Letter Position over the other 
positions. The Amortization Position does not afford such firms comparable flexibility, 
while the Revised ED Position will be costlier for such firms to implement. The Revised 
ED Position requires firms to obtain fair-value appraisals of all their units’ net assets 
each time impairment reviews are necessitated; this is likely to be more costly for firms 
with several large reporting units.  
[H2a] The probability that a firm supports the Comment Letter Position over both 
the Amortization Position and the Revised ED Position increases with the number 
and size of its reporting-units.  
 
Empirical data on “the number and size of reporting units” are not available. 
SFAS 131, however, requires firms to disclose data on business segments. I use the 
number of business segments to proxy for the number of reporting units, and the sales of 
business segments (which when aggregated is the sales of the firm) to proxy for the size 
of reporting units. I use one combined variable to represent the flexibility given by “the 
number and size of reporting units,” viz., Ln(Seg)*Ln(Sales), where Ln(Seg) is log of the 
number of segments and Ln(Sales) is log of firm sales. Holding the number of segments 
constant, increasing total sales increases the average segment size (and flexibility to hide 
impairments in a segment).  Holding the total sales constant, increasing the number of 
segments gives more choice of units to allocate acquired goodwill.  
  In addition to Ln(Seg)*Ln(Sales), I also use the number of segments alone as an 
H2a proxy. It is possible that Ln(Seg)*Ln(Sales) is only capturing the size of the firm, 
i.e., not the size and complexity of its business segments. Since Ln(Seg) cannot directly 
proxy for the size of business segments, using Ln(Seg) mitigates the possibility that 
results from using Ln(Seg)*Ln(Sales) are driven only by firm size. Using Ln(Seg) to   13
proxy for the number of reporting units can bias against finding results consistent with 
H2a since the number of segments is always weakly smaller than number of units. 
 
3.2.2. Reporting-Units’ Fair-Value-to-Book-Value (FTB) Ratios  
After acquired goodwill is allocated to reporting units, firms must periodically 
evaluate whether it is impaired. SFAS 142 requires such impairment testing only for units 
with fair-value-to-book-value (FTB) ratios less than one (implicitly assigning, at this 
step, all of the excess of a unit’s fair value over book value to acquired goodwill). While 
this requirement was not part of ED 201-R, supporters of the Comment Letter Position 
did lobby for a similar requirement. To see this note that under the Comment Letter 
Position, the fair value of acquired goodwill is defined as the excess of a unit’s total fair 
value over its book value (excluding goodwill). It is unlikely, however, that all of this 
excess is due to acquired goodwill: internally generated rents and the understatement of 
book values likely account for some of the excess. Ceteris paribus, the higher a unit’s 
FTB ratio, the more likely the Comment Letter Position will overstate the fair value of 
acquired goodwill, and thus the more likely losses to acquired goodwill can be avoided. 
Thus, I expect lobbying firms with high unit-FTB ratios to support the Comment Letter 
Position (see also Appendix 2).  
Lobbying firms with low unit-FTB ratios are more likely to support the 
Amortization Position: impairment testing is likely result to in immediate loss recognition 
for such firms; but under amortization, the cost of impairment for low FTB ratio firms 
can be spread over several years. 
I do not, however, expect reporting-unit FTB ratios to explain firms’ choice of the 
Revised ED Position. The Revised ED Position imposes costs on both units with high and 
low FTB ratios. Units with low FTB ratios will, by definition, have low fair-value 
estimates of goodwill under the Revised ED Position, making management of impairment 
less likely. Units with high FTB ratios are more likely to generate higher fair-value 
estimates of goodwill under the Comment Letter Position (see Figure 2).
11  
[H2b] The probability that a firm supports the Comment Letter Position over the 
Amortization Position increases with its reporting-units’ FTB ratios.  
                                                 
11 The claim is made ceteris paribus—i.e., after controlling for flexibility in estimating the fair values of 
non-goodwill net assets (tested in H2c).    14
 
Reporting-unit FTB (fair-value-to-book-value) ratios are unobservable. A simple 
proxy is firm-wide MTB (market-to-book). Another proxy is abnormal MTB, Abn.MtB. 
Abn.MtB is the excess of firm-wide MTB over size-industry average MTB.
12 If firm-wide 
MTB is affected by industry-wide growth options that are not reflected at the reporting-
unit level, then Abn.MtB is a cleaner measure of reporting-unit FTB.
13 
 
3.2.3. The Ratio of Unverifiable Net Assets to Total Net Assets 
  For units with FTB ratios less than one, SFAS 142 requires recording impairment 
losses when the “implied fair value” of goodwill is less than its historical book value. ED 
201-R had a similar requirement for recording impairment losses, except that losses were 
not conditional on FTB being less than one. In both ED 201-R and SFAS 142, the 
“implied fair value” of a unit’s goodwill is difference between the unit’s total fair-value 
and the fair value of its non-goodwill net assets. In a firm, fair values of some net assets 
(e.g., cash, investments, payables, etc.) can be verified more readily than the fair values 
of others (e.g., firm-specific assets such as specialized plant and equipment). Ceteris 
paribus, the greater the proportion of unverifiable net assets, the greater the flexibility in 
estimating the fair value of net assets and goodwill, and thus, the greater the discretion in 
determining impairments.  
The impairment flexibility associated with a high proportion of unverifiable net 
assets is not afforded under the Comment Letter Position because here book values of net 
assets are used in calculating the “implied fair value” of goodwill. Under the Revised ED 
Position, however, fair values of net assets are used in the “implied fair value” of 
goodwill calculation. Thus, firms with more unverifiable net assets are likely to support 
the Revised ED Position over the Comment Letter Position. Assuming discretion 
motivated lobbying positions, the unverifiability of net assets cannot ex ante differentiate 
a firm’s choice between the Comment Letter Position and the Amortization Position.  
[H2c] The probability that a firm supports the Comment Letter Position over the 
Revised ED Position increases with the verifiability of net assets. 
                                                 
12 In my main tests, I define a firm’s size-industry as all companies within the same sales quartile of its 
two-digit NAICS code. For robustness, I show that results hold under alternate definitions of size-industry.  
13 For example, a distressed firm in a growth industry can have a firm-wide MTB that is not reflective of 
unbiased estimates of its units’ FTB.   15
 
I define the ratio of [Cash + Investments – Debt – Preferred Equity] to [Assets – 
Liabilities] as the verifiable-net-assets ratio (VNA). The denominator in VNA is total net 
assets, while the numerator is net-asset items with more readily verifiable fair values 
(Richardson et al., 2005). Items excluded from the numerator include plant, equipment, 
receivables, payables, etc. These items are less likely to have actively traded market 
prices, so fair-value estimates of these items likely more subjective. Thus, as VNA 
increases, subjectivity in estimating the “implied fair value” of goodwill decreases. To 
get a variable that increases in subjectivity, I multiply the VNA ratio by -1, and call the 
result the unverifiable-net-assets ratio, UNA.  
  When the numerator in VNA is greater than the denominator, UNA will be low, 
indicating that the firm has a lower ability to manage fair-value goodwill estimates. 
However, a higher proportion of verifiable net assets to total net assets can be the result 
of fewer verifiable liabilities compared to total liabilities.
14 By overstating (understating) 
unverifiable liabilities, firms can understate (overstate) their non-goodwill net assets, and 
thus overstate (understate) goodwill. Thus, firms with above-one VNA (i.e., low UNA) 
can still manage goodwill write-offs by opportunistically valuing certain unverifiable 
liabilities. In such cases, a more accurate measure of the verifiability of net assets is the 
closeness of VNA to one (a ratio of one indicates that all net assets are “verifiable net 
assets;” deviations of the ratio from one indicate that some assets and/or liabilities have 
been excluded from “verifiable net assets”). Thus, as an alternative proxy to UNA, I 
compute a variable that captures the absolute distance of VNA from one and call this 
variable Mod.UNA (for modified UNA). Mod.UNA is defined as | (1 - |VNA|) |. Larger 
values of Mod.UNA correspond to larger absolute distances from one, and thus more 
flexibility in estimating the fair value of goodwill. On average, I expect Mod.UNA to be 
positively correlated with UNA and thus, a firm’s ability to manage impairment losses to 
increase in Mod.UNA as well. 
 
                                                 
14 For example, consider a firm with $100 in assets and $60 in liabilities. All of the assets are verifiable, but 
only $20 of the liabilities are verifiable. Thus, verifiable net assets are $80, total net assets are $40, and the 
VNA ratio is 2.    16
3.2.4. The Magnitude of Impairment Charges that can be Managed 
  The previous three hypotheses (H2a, H2b, and H2c) describe characteristics that 
give firms a higher probability of managing impairment. The significance of impairment 
discretion is also likely increasing in the magnitude of write-offs that can be managed. I 
call this magnitude the standard’s “wealth effect” on a lobbyist. The wealth effect 
includes the standard’s absolute (i.e., dollar) effect, its effect relative to one’s total 
wealth, and its effect relative to peer-effects. The own-wealth relative effect is due to the 
opportunity cost of lobbying: although a standard has a high dollar effect on a firm, the 
firm will not lobby if this dollar effect represents an insignificant portion of its total 
wealth. The description of peer-relative effects is motivated from Stigler (1971) who 
notes that firms in an industry have heterogeneous interests: firms can lobby against 
collective goods even if it benefits them, provided it benefits their competitors more.
15 
I propose that wealth effects of impairment discretion can be measured by firms’ 
abnormal goodwill-to-assets. I define abnormal goodwill as the deviation in a firm’s 
book goodwill-to-assets from its size-industry’s average goodwill-to-assets. For firms 
with positive (negative) abnormal goodwill-to-assets, the standard has positive (negative) 
wealth effects. I use abnormal goodwill-to-assets in lieu of just goodwill-to-assets or 
unscaled goodwill because the former likely better captures all three elements of the 
wealth effect. Empirical proxies for abnormal goodwill-to-assets, just goodwill-to-assets, 
and unscaled goodwill are correlated; but unscaled goodwill likely captures only the 
dollar effect, while just goodwill-to-assets is unlikely to capture peer effects. In empirical 
tests, I use abnormal intangibles-to-assets (Abn.ItA) to proxy for abnormal goodwill-to-
assets because more than half of the lobbying firms do not separately listed goodwill.  
I expect that lobbying firms’ support for pro-impairment positions over the 
Amortization Position increases in abnormal goodwill-to-assets, i.e., in the standard’s 
positive wealth effects. This is because pro-impairment positions offer greater probability 
of managing impairments, and such probability only assumes significance if the wealth-
effects from impairment management are positive. I do not expect abnormal goodwill-to-
assets to distinguish firm-support between the two impairment positions.  
[H2d] The probability that a firm supports the Comment Letter Position over the 
                                                 
15 See Ramanna (2007) for a fuller description of how lobbyists likely measure standards’ wealth effects.    17
Amortization Position increases with abnormal goodwill.  
 
The hypotheses above (H2a–H2d) test whether support for unverifiable fair-
value-based impairment in SFAS 142 increases in firms’ discretion potential. To a firm, 
there are benefits and costs associated with this discretion. The benefits are the increased 
potential to manage financials; the costs can include a higher cost-of-capital due to the 
risk opportunistic management (by the firm in question or by other firms). The 
hypotheses assume that for supporters (opponents) of impairment, the benefits from 
greater discretion exceed (are exceeded by) its possible costs. Thus, tests of the 
hypotheses implicitly test this assumption.  
Conditional on rational lobbying, understanding why firms lobby for a standard 
indicates how they intend to use that standard. Thus, finding that discretion motivates 
firms’ support for goodwill impairment, suggests that at least some management of 
impairment decisions is occurring post SFAS 142. Further, agency theory predicts that at 
least some of this management is opportunistic.
16 The unverifiable discretion in 
impairment rules allows firms to either delay write-offs (resulting in overstated assets and 
earnings) or accelerate write-offs (resulting in understated assets and earnings).  
There are reasons other than discretion for firms to support goodwill impairment. 
(1) Impairment was offered under purchase accounting, which, because it requires all 
acquired assets and liabilities to be recorded at fair values, can make financial statements 
more informative. Thus, observed “support” for impairment may simply be support for 
purchase. (2) Impairment was offered as an alternative to amortization. Thus, observed 
“support” for impairment may simply be opposition to amortization. If either of these 
alternate reasons alone motivated firm support for impairment, then such support is 
unlikely to increase in firms’ discretion potential under the impairment standards. 
 
4. Empirical Analysis 
4.1. Research Design for H1a 
I identify 43 distinct Congresspersons who took active pro-pooling positions at 
                                                 
16 Consistent with this prediction, Ramanna and Watts (2006) find that in a sample of firms with market 
indications of impairment, firms with greater discretion are more likely to avoid write-offs.    18
the Senate/House hearings and/or one of the two other events identified in §3.1. I 
compare these pro-pooling Congresspersons to all other members of the 106
th Congress 
(1999–2000).
17 For this combined set of Congresspersons (pro-pooling and others), I 
obtain data on contributions made by the PACs of all firms and industry associations that 
lobbied on the original FASB proposal (ED 201, abolish pooling, amortize goodwill).
18  
For each Congressperson, I aggregate PAC contributions from firms and 
associations by lobbying position. Thus, I obtain two data points for each member of 
Congress: PAC contributions from the pro-pooling group and PAC contributions from 
the anti-pooling group. For each Congressperson, I scale total group-contributions by 
total campaign receipts. From H1a, the probability that a Congressperson took a pro-
pooling stance is increasing in contributions from the pro-pooling lobbying group. 
Accordingly, I run a probit regression on the combined sample of Congresspersons, 
where the dependent variable coded as “1” for pro-pooling Congresspersons and “0” for 
all other Congresspersons. As explanatory variables, I include scaled contributions from 
the pro- and anti-pooling lobbying groups. In addition, I include controls for 
Congresspersons’ ideologies and a committee-membership dummy (dummy indicates if 
Congresspersons are members of House Finance Subcommittee/ Senate Banking 
Committee). 
The control variables help address alternate hypotheses. The committee-
membership dummy controls for the possibility that only Congresspersons with relevant 
finance expertise became interested in pooling. If this variable completely explains 
Congressional positions on pooling, then H1a will be rejected. The ideology variables 
similarly control for the possibility that Congressional positions on pooling can be 
explained by political beliefs. The ideology variables are “Common Space Scores,” 
                                                 
17 This group of all other Congresspersons includes six members who participated in the hearings, but 
whose positions on pooling are ambiguous. An example of an ambiguous position is that of Sen. Sarbanes 
who participated in the Senate hearings on pooling, but cautioned that “Congress would be entering into 
very dangerous ground” by legislating on accounting standards (U.S. Senate 2000, p.9). Results are 
invariant to including these six as pro-pooling Congresspersons, or excluding them from the sample 
altogether. Note that while these Congresspersons were supportive of FASB independence, none of them 
actively supported the anti-pooling (i.e., original FASB) position. 
18 I identify 102 distinct US firms, and 21 industry associations lobbying on ED 201. PAC data were 
obtained from the Federal Election Commission and the Center for Responsive Politics. Not all lobbying 
firms have PACs, and not all PACs made contributions to all Congresspersons. Thus, for the 535 members 
of Congress and the 123 lobbying firms/associations, I found data on about eleven thousand distinct firm-
Congressperson contributions of a possible sixty-five thousand pairs.   19
commonly used in political science. The scores are obtained from a spatial voting 
analysis of Congresspersons’ roll-call records, a procedure fully described by Poole 
(1998). Intuitively, Common Space Scores are much like “factors” in a factor analysis. 
These scores are the result of explaining, on two dimensions, Congresspersons’ votes 
over their Congressional life. Like factors, the scores have no ex-ante interpretation, 
although ex post the first dimension has been interpreted as party identity, while the 
second dimension has typically captured non-partisan voting trends.
19 
Because of the possible endogeneity of PAC contributions (see §3.1), the probit 
model of Congressional positions is estimated as the second equation in a simultaneous 
recursive system. The first equation in this system models the determinants of pro-
pooling groups’ PAC contributions: i.e., the dependent variable in the first equation is 
PAC contributions from pro-pooling groups. The explanatory variables in the first 
equation are the ideology controls and committee-membership dummy described above. 
The simultaneous recursive system addresses the possibility that pro-pooling groups 
targeted PAC contributions at Congresspersons already predisposed to supporting them.
20  
 
4.2. Results for H1a 
  Table 2 reports mean and median PAC contributions from lobbying groups to 
Congresspersons. The mean (median) PAC contribution from pro-pooling groups to pro-
pooling Congresspersons was 13.36% (14.47%) of those Congresspersons’ total PAC 
receipts. Consistent with H1a, this number is statistically greater than the mean (median) 
PAC contribution from pro-pooling groups to other Congresspersons—8.86% (8.28%). 
The number is also greater than (i) the mean (median) PAC contribution from anti-
pooling groups to pro-pooling Congresspersons, and (ii) the mean (median) PAC 
contribution from anti-pooling groups to other Congresspersons.
21  
  Table 3 reports the result of the probit model of Congressional positions 
                                                 
19 Common Space Scores are obtained from Keith Poole’s website, VoteView.com.  
20 The simultaneous system is recursive and not interdependent because the dependent variable in the 
second equation (i.e., Congressional positions on pooling) is not included as an explanatory variables in the 
first equation (i.e., as a determinant of PAC contributions). This is consistent with the notion that firms’ 
PAC contributions are not motivated by single issues, but rather by Congresspersons’ overall dispositions.  
21 On average, PAC contributions from pro-pooling groups are greater than PAC contributions from anti-
pooling groups, suggesting that pro-pooling groups are more politically active. This result reiterates the 
importance of testing H1a in a multivariate setting that controls for the endogeneity of PAC contributions.    20
(estimated in the simultaneous recursive system described above). I run two 
specifications: in the first (second), I scale Congresspersons’ PAC receipts from pro- and 
anti-pooling groups by total PAC receipts (by total receipts from all sources—i.e., 
including soft money, direct lobbying money, etc.). In both specifications, as predicted by 
H1a, the probit-model coefficient on PAC contributions of pro-pooling groups is positive 
and significant. As noted earlier, I do not interpret this result as PAC money was used to 
buy Congressional positions solely on pooling. Relations with Congresspersons are likely 
developed over long periods, and firms likely give money to friendly Congresspersons. 
Thus, consistent with H1a, the results suggest that Congresspersons pressuring the FASB 
over pooling are likely allies of pro-pooling firms and associations.  
  Table 3 also reveals that Congressional support for pooling is increasing in the 
committee membership dummy, suggesting that Congresspersons who became involved 
in support of pooling were more likely to have relevant finance expertise. Further, only 
the second of the two ideology dimensions is significant suggesting that Congressional 
support for pooling was non-partisan.  
 
4.3. Research Design for H1b and H2 
  H1b predicts that after successfully generating Congressional pressure against the 
FASB’s original proposal, pro-poolers lobbied for the goodwill impairment rules now 
seen in SFAS 142. As described in §3.2, the Comment Letter Position (of firms lobbying 
on the revised ED) most closely resembles the goodwill impairment rules in SFAS 142. 
Thus, H1b can be tested by checking if support for the Comment Letter Position (as 
compared to the two other firm positions) is higher among pro-pooling firms. In other 
words, H1b can be tested by examining if a firm’s support for pooling on the original ED 
is a determinant of support for the Comment Letter Position in the revised ED. Since H2 
also examines the determinants of firms’ support for the Comment Letter Position (over 
other firm positions), tests of H1b are reported with tests of H2.  
 
4.3.1. Jointly Modeling H2 (i.e., Lobbying Positions) and the Lobbying Decision 
H2 makes predictions on how firms’ lobbying positions on the revised ED vary 
with characteristics measuring discretion. Managers’ lobbying positions can be related to   21
their decision to lobby in the first place. For example, if discretion potential explains 
lobbying positions, firms that did not lobby likely expected lower net benefits from 
discretion. Thus, I control for the self-selection of firms into the set of lobbyists. Prior 
accounting research has found that lobbying decisions can be explained by: (1) size 
(Watts and Zimmerman 1978); (2) other cash-flow effects not captured by size (Francis 
1987); and (3) contracting effects (Deakin 1989).  
Apropos (1), I expect larger firms, with greater expected benefits from lobbying, 
are more likely to lobby.
22 I measure firm size using Ln(Sales). Apropos (2), I expect the 
significance of lobbying on goodwill impairment to increase in the absolute value of 
abnormal goodwill-to-assets. In §3.2.4, I argue that the standard’s “wealth effects” are 
increasing in abnormal goodwill-to-assets, and that firms with positive (negative) wealth 
effects lobby for pro-impairment positions (amortization). Thus, I expect that the decision 
to lobby likely increases in the absolute value of wealth effects, measured as |Abn.ItA|.
23   
  Apropos (3), I consider the standard’s potential impact on debt contracts, 
compensation contracts, and stock prices. Debt contracts can be asset-based and/or 
income-based, but frequently exclude the effects of goodwill and other intangibles.
24 
Firms with goodwill-based debt contacts that also include the effects of mandatory 
GAAP changes
 25 are likely concerned with goodwill impairment’s potential impact. I use 
the firm’s debt-to-assets to proxy for debt contracting concerns. Dichev and Skinner 
(2002) find that debt-to-assets is a relatively noisy proxy for the probability of debt 
covenant violation; however, holding constant this probability, debt-to-assets is likely a 
good proxy for the cost of debt covenant violation (the more leverage a firm has, the 
more costly it will be to renegotiate contracts once covenants are violated). Ideally, debt-
                                                 
22 To see this note that: (a) larger firms likely have larger absolute stakes in the outcome of proposed 
standards; (b) larger firms are more visible and likely have larger influence with the FASB; and (c) if there 
are scale economies in the costs of lobbying, then larger firms with more accounting staff and better 
expertise likely have lower costs. 
23 As an additional control for (2), I include proxies for firms’ past M&A activity (e.g., market value of 
acquisitions from 1995–2000, market value of pooling acquisitions from 1995–2000, and ratio of pooling 
to total acquisitions). These data are not available for all sample firms. To the extent that it is, these 
acquisition variables do not add explanatory power over abnormal goodwill-to-assets. 
24 Of a sample of 503 firms with available covenant data and MTB < 1, Beatty and Weber (2005) find that 
288 (57%) had covenants that were unlikely to be affected by goodwill. 
25 In a sample of 206 firms, Beatty et al. (2002) find that about 25% have covenants that include the effects 
of mandatory accounting changes in calculations. If lobbying positions are influenced by covenant 
implications, then presumably covenants of lobbying firms include the effect of GAAP changes.    22
to-assets should be interacted with a dummy that indicates whether a firm has goodwill-
based covenants and whether those covenants include the effects of mandatory GAAP 
changes. Unfortunately, I cannot observe this information for most lobbying firms 
because lobbying firms tend to be large, and so are unlikely to have covenants that meet 
the materiality threshold for disclosure.  
Compensation contracts are usually written on net income, and thus do include 
the effects of goodwill and other intangibles (Murphy 1999). Firms that expect to be 
affected by impairment’s impact on net income are more likely to lobby if their managers 
are compensated on net income. The larger the proportion of net-income-based 
managerial pay, the more likely such firms will lobby (assuming that managers are 
responsible for lobbying decisions). I use the ratio of a CEO’s Bonus to Total Cash 
Compensation to measure compensation contracting concerns.
26 
Finally, to the extent that managers believe that accounting numbers directly map 
into stock prices, they should be concerned with the effects of impairment on their stock 
price. The more correlated price is to accounting income, the more likely a manager is 
concerned about the price impact of goodwill impairment. In the ED, goodwill 
impairment loss is recognized above-the-line. Thus, the more correlated a firm’s price is 
to its operating income, the more likely its manager will lobby. I measure stock pricing 
concerns using ERC, the coefficient from regressing a firm’s price on its operating 
income using at least 16 and up to 20 quarters prior to ED 201-R.
27  
To summarize, I expect that the decision to lobby is increasing in (1) firm size, (2) 
absolute value of abnormal goodwill, and (3) contracting effects (i.e., debt, compensation 
and stock pricing concerns). To control for the self-selection of lobbyists, I jointly model 
the decision to lobby and positions upon lobbying using a two-level nested multinomial 
logit model. The first level models the probability that firms lobby: this is a binary choice 
(i.e., lobby or not). For those firms that lobby, the second level models the probability of 
lobbying positions: this is a multinomial choice (i.e., Comment Letter Position v. Revised 
ED Position v. Amortization Position). The nested model has an “inclusive value” 
parameter to capture correlation between the two levels (see Appendix 3 for details). 
                                                 
26 This proxy assumes that CEO bonus is based on net income (Murphy 1999).  
27 Following Beatty and Weber (2005), if the coefficient from the regression is less than zero, I set it to 
zero. This is because negative ERCs have little meaning in this context.    23
 
4.4. Descriptive Statistics of Firms Lobbying on the Original and Revised EDs  
Before presenting the results for H2, in Table 4, I discuss the distribution of firms 
across lobbying positions in both the original and revised EDs (i.e., pro-pooling v. anti-
pooling on the original ED; Amortization Position v. Revised ED Position v. Comment 
Letter Position on the revised ED). I identified 186 distinct firms lobbying on either of 
the two proposals: of these, 52 firms lobbied on both. Thirty-one pro-pooling firms from 
the original ED also lobbied on the revised ED: of these, only five supported the 
Amortization Position, while 18 supported the Comment Letter Position (consistent with 
H1b). Twenty-one anti-pooling firms from the original ED also lobbied on the revised 
ED: of these, strangely, eight supported the Comment Letter Position. Table 4 also 
reports that half of all lobbyists from the original ED did not lobby on the revised ED. 
Increased certainty about the project’s outcome following Congressional intervention 
may have made it cost ineffective for these firms to lobby. Eighty-two firms lobbying on 
the revised ED did not lobby on the original ED, but these new lobbyists supported 
goodwill impairment over amortization by nearly a two-to-one margin.  
Appendix 4 reports across lobbying positions the median values of discretion 
proxies used to test H2, viz., Abn.MtB and MtB for H2a; Ln(Seg)*Ln(Sales) and Ln(Seg) 
for H2b; UNA and Mod.UNA for H2c; and Abn.ItA for H2d. In the definitions of Abn.MtB 
and Abn.ItA, a firm’s “size-industry” is all companies within the same sales quartile of its 
two-digit NAICS code.
28 All data are from the most recent fiscal year prior to ED 201-R, 
and all ratios are winsorized at the 5
th and 95
th percentile of size-industries.
29 From 
Appendix 4, pro-pooling firms that supported the Comment Letter Position have among 
the highest discretion potential of any group in the table. The eight anti-pooling firms that 
then supported the Comment Letter Position have low Abn.MtB but high Abn.ItA, 
suggesting that these firms’ support for impairment was driven by the desire to take 
write-offs. The discretion potential of pro-pooling firms not lobbying on the revised ED 
is low relative to other groups of firms, suggesting that impairment management by these 
                                                 
28 Using two-digit over three-digit NAICS is likely more informative for lobbying studies, given that 
lobbying firms tend to be large multi-sector firms.  
29 Results are unchanged when variables are winsorized at the 1
st and 99
th percentile within size-industries. 
However, for size-industries with fewer than 100 firms, 1st-percentile winsorizing is ineffective in 
mitigating outliers’ influence. Hence, I choose 5th-percentile winsorizing.    24
pro-poolers is less probable. This lower probability may have made it cost ineffective for 
these firms to lobby on the revised ED.  
 
4.5. Univariate Results for H1b and H2   
Table 5A presents univariate comparisons of the discretion proxies used to test 
H2. I use the t test (Wilcoxan test) to compare means (medians). Consistent with H2a, the 
mean and median values of proxies for the number and size of reporting units, viz., 
Ln(Seg)*Ln(Sales) and Ln(Seg), are larger for Comment Letter Position firms than for 
other firms. Consistent with H2b, the mean and median values of proxies for reporting-
unit FTB ratios, viz., Abn.MtB and MtB, are larger for Comment Letter Position firms 
than for Amortization Position firms. Consistent with H2c, the mean and median values 
of proxies for the unverifiability of net assets, viz., UNA and Mod.UNA, are larger for 
Revised ED Position firms than for Comment Letter Position firms. Consistent with H2d, 
the mean and median values of the proxy for impairment’s wealth effects on a firm, viz., 
Abn.ItA, are larger for Comment Letter Position firms than for Amortization Position 
firms. All of the above comparisons are statistically significant with one exception: the 
mean and median comparisons of proxies for the number and size of reporting units 
across Comment Letter Position firms and Amortization Position firms.  
As preliminary evidence supporting H1b, Table 5A also reports that 40% of 
Comment Letter Position firms supported pooling in the original ED compared to 13% 
and 17% of Amortization Position and Revised ED Position firms, respectively.  
As a control variable in the H2 regressions, I add a dummy variable for the 
lobbying positions of firms’ industry associations. This variable is set to “1” if a firm’s 
industry association lobbied against it, and “0” otherwise. Since most industry groups 
lobbying on ED 201-R supported the Revised ED Position, this control variable ensures 
that the multivariate results are not driven by an omitted variable. Table 5A reports that 
87% of Amortization Position firms, 63% of Comment Letter Position firms, and only 
2% of Revised ED Position firms were opposed by their industry association.  
Table 5B presents univariate comparisons for lobbying-decision variables. The 
mean and median size of firms lobbying on the revised ED is significantly larger than 
that of non-lobbying firms. Non-lobbying firms are all FY 2000 firms in the   25
COMPUSTAT universe subject to data availability. The mean and median absolute 
abnormal intangibles-to-assets are also larger for lobbying firms than for non-lobbying 
firms, although the differences are not significant. Finally, median values of debt/assets, 
bonus/compensation and ERC are significantly larger for lobbying firms.  
Table 5B also reports that 42% of firms lobbying on the revised ED also lobbied 
on the original ED. I create a dummy variable (Lobb.Orig.ED) set to “1” for firms 
lobbying on the original ED, “0” otherwise. I include this dummy as a control variable in 
modeling the determinants of firms’ decision to lobby on the revised ED. This dummy 
performs an important control function in multivariate tests of H1b. Recall that H1b is 
tested with H2 in a nested logit structure where the decision to lobby on the revised ED 
and positions upon lobbying are jointly modeled. To test H1b, I use a pro-pooling 
indicator variable in the lobbying-positions’ regression. This pro-pooling indicator can 
take the value “1” only if the firm lobbied on the original ED in the first place. Without 
Lobb.Orig.ED a significant coefficient on the pro-pooling indicator could be simply due 
to the firm lobbying on the original ED and not due to the direction of that lobbying. In 
other words, Lobb.Orig.ED mitigates the possibility that the pro-pooling indicator is 
statistically significant due to an omitted variable.  
In H2, I suggest that impairment testing favors firms with several large reporting 
units and high FTB ratios. To the extent that such firms are systematically clustered in a 
few industries, controlling for industry-specific effects is necessary. Table 5C presents 
the distribution of lobbying positions on the revised ED by industry. Industry is defined 
by first two digits of the firms’ NAICS codes. I run a Freeman-Halton (Fisher’s Exact) 
test to check for systematic relations in the table. The p-value from this test is 0.62, 
failing to reject the null hypothesis of no industry-wide-clustering across positions. 
 
4.6. Multivariate Results for H1b and H2 
Table 6A presents results of multivariate tests of H1b and H2 using the two-level 
nested multinomial logit model described earlier. Level one is the binary decision to 
lobby on the revised ED. Level two is the multinomial decision to choose one of the three 
lobbying positions on the revised ED. The explanatory variables in level one are size, 
abnormal-goodwill-to-assets, the contracting variables, and a dummy for whether the   26
firm lobbied on the original ED. The explanatory variables in level two are the discretion 
proxies from H2, a dummy to indicate whether the firm was pro-pooling on the original 
ED (to test H1b), and a dummy to control for the lobbying positions of firms’ industry 
associations. For the multinomial logit in level two, I use the Comment Letter Position as 
the base case: this follows from §3.2 where I discuss how the Comment Letter Position 
most closely resembles the final standard. Thus, parameter estimates from level two 
should be interpreted as the effect of explanatory variables on the choice of the 
Amortization Position or Revised ED Position over the Comment Letter Position. 
Accordingly, the parameter estimates are prefixed by “AM - CL” and “Rev - CL.” 
Requiring contracting variables in level one severely limits the sample size: the 
available sample drops from 8912 level-one firms and 115 level-two firms to 1435 level-
one firms and 86 level-two firms. Since these variables are included as controls, in 
primary specifications, i.e., (1) through (4), of the model, I omit them and avail of the 
larger number of observations. Even without these contracting variables, data 
requirements for the discretion proxies in H2 reduce the population of 134 listed firms 
that lobbied on the revised ED to 115 firms.  
Since parameter estimates from the nested model cannot be directly interpreted, in 
Table 6A, I only report t-statistics (later I report marginal effects). In specification (1), I 
use Ln(Seg)*Ln(Sales) to proxy for the number and size of reporting units (H2a), 
Abn.MtB to proxy for fair-value-to-book-value ratios (H2b), UNA to proxy for the 
proportion of unverifiable fair values (H2c), and Abn.ItA to proxy for wealth effects 
(H2d). Specification (2) is similar to (1) except that I use Ln(Seg) alone to proxy for the 
number and size of reporting units. Specification (3) is similar to (1) except that I use just 
MtB to proxy for fair-value-to-book-value ratios. Specification (4) is similar to (1) except 
that I use just Mod.UNA to proxy for the ratio of unverifiable fair values. In specifications 
(1) through (4), all proxies for H2 and H1b have their predicted sign and statistical 
significance. Specifically, the evidence is consistent with (a) lobbying support for SFAS 
142 goodwill impairment increasing in discretion potential, and (b) pro-poolers 
supporting the impairment rules now in SFAS 142.  
When the contracting variables are included, specifications (5) and (6) of Table 
6A, all previous results hold. However, in specification (6), where nearly 35% of level-  27
two observations are lost due to data requirements, the coefficient on Abn.MtB (H2b) 
loses statistical significance. Among the contracting variables, debt-to-assets is not 
significant, likely due to noise in this variable from omitting the covenant dummy 
described earlier; bonus-to-compensation is significantly positive, consistent with the 
hypothesis that managers lobbying on impairment were concerned about its effect on 
their own compensation (through accounting income); ERC is not significant, despite 
managers’ claims that they were concerned about the standard’s effect on stock prices.  
The “inclusive value” parameter that captures the correlation between the two 
levels of the nested model is close to one in all specifications, i.e., (1) through (6), 
suggesting that the error terms from the two levels are independent (see Appendix 3).  
Since the parameter estimates in Table 6A cannot be directly interpreted for 
economic significance, Table 6B reports their marginal effects. The columns in Table 6B 
are identical to Table 6A (except that marginal effects are reported instead of t-statistics). 
The marginal effect of a continuous variable in Table 6B is the change in outcome 
probability when the continuous variable is increased from one standard deviation below 
its mean value to one standard deviation above its mean value. The marginal effect of a 
dummy variable is the change in outcome probability when the dummy variable is 
increased from zero to one. When calculating the marginal effect of a given explanatory 
variable, all other level-two variables are set to their mean values, while all other level-
one variables are set to their 90
th percentile value. This is because consistent with prior 
studies on lobbying in accounting, I find the firm size in level-one is a very important 
determinant of lobbying decisions, and that all other variables are economically 
unimportant in explaining lobbying unless firm size is large.  
Specification (1) of Table 6B reports that a standard deviation increase in 
Ln(Seg)*Ln(Sales) about its mean decreases the probability of supporting the 
Amortization Position (Revised ED Position) over the Comment Letter Position by 
23.5% (23.2%). These results are consistent with H2a: firms with several large reporting 
units have a higher potential to manage impairments under the Comment Letter Position 
than under the two other positions. A standard-deviation increase in Abn.MTB about its 
mean decreases the probability of supporting the Amortization Position over the 
Comment Letter Position by 12.5%. This result is consistent with H2b: firms with high   28
FTB units have a higher potential to manage impairments under the Comment Letter 
Position than under the Amortization Position. A standard deviation increase in UNA 
about its mean increases the probability of supporting the Revised ED Position over the 
Comment Letter Position by 16%. This result is consistent with H2c: firms with less 
verifiable net assets have a higher potential to manage impairments under the Revised ED 
Position.  
Consistent with H2d, I also find in Table 6B (1) that a standard deviation increase 
in Abn.ItA about its mean decreases the probability of supporting the Amortization 
Position over the Comment Letter Position by 15.2%. Abn.ItA proxies for the “wealth 
effects” of the standard, including peer-relative effects. Firms with low (high) Abn.ItA are 
less (more) likely to benefit from impairment management than their peers, and are thus 
more likely to choose amortization (impairment). The finding that peer effects motivate 
lobbying is consistent with Stigler’s (1971) theory of regulation of collective goods. To 
my knowledge, it has not been previously documented in accounting lobbying.  
Table 6B (1) also reports that the probability that a firm supports the Amortization 
Position (Revised ED Position) over the Comment Letter Position in the revised ED is 
10% (9.2%) lower if the firm supported pooling in the original ED. This result is 
consistent with H1b—i.e., the hypothesis that the unverifiable fair-value-based 
impairment test in SFAS 142 (represented by the Comment Letter Position) is partially 
the outcome of pressure by pro-pooling firms.  
Marginal effects from other specifications, i.e., (2) through (6), in Table 6B are 
similar to those reported above. 
 
4.7. Robustness of Multivariate Results for H1b and H2 
The economic significance of Abn.ItA suggests that, consistent with H2d, firms 
are strategic in their lobbying decisions and positions (i.e., firms consider the effect of 
accounting standards on peers when lobbying). This result depends on the 
appropriateness of size-industry-differencing. To ensure that my definitions of size-
industry (i.e., size quartiles within two-digit NAICS codes) do not drive these results, I 
rerun the Table 6A regressions using the following alternate definitions: (1) size industry 
is defined using size quartiles within three-digit NAICS codes; (2) size industry is   29
defined using size quartiles within two-digit SIC codes. I also test if results hold without 
any size-industry differencing, i.e., I use just intangibles-to-assets for H2d. In all these 
robustness tests, all parameters retain their predicted sign and significance.  
The multivariate results for H2 and H1b are also robust to using in lieu of the 
nested multinomial logit model: (a) a bivariate probit selection model, where I collapse 
the second level into a binary choice (i.e., impairment v. amortization), and (b) a bivariate 
ordered probit model, where I model the second level as an ordered choice (with order 
decreasing from Comment Letter Position to Revised ED Position to Amortization 
Position). Other robustness tests include: (1) using assets, in lieu of sales, to define size-
industries; (2) winsorizing all variables at the 1
st and 99
th percentile of size-industry 
values, in lieu of 5
th and 95
th percentile; and (3) using un-weighted averages, in lieu of 
sales-weighted averages, to calculate industry means. In case of (1), results are similar, 
although some variables lose statistical significance. In case of (2) and (3), results are 
similar in sign and significance to those reported in Table 6A. 
To mitigate concerns about the effects of extreme observations, I also obtain 
jackknifed parameter estimates for the nested multinomial logit model. The jackknife 
estimates closely resemble their MLE counterparts.  
 
5. Conclusion 
Several accounting standards in recent years have used fair values.
30 Holthausen 
and Watts (2001) argue that such fair values, when not based on actively traded market 
prices, i.e., when unverifiable, can increase opportunism. I test this argument through a 
political-economy study of a recent prominent standard that uses unverifiable fair values: 
SFAS 142, accounting for acquired goodwill.  
SFAS 142 was part of the FASB’s project to revamp business combinations 
accounting. This project was taken on in part due to FASB and SEC concerns over 
pooling misuse (Adams 1997, Turner 1999, FASB 1999). The project resulted in the 
elimination of pooling; all business combinations must now use the purchase method. 
Acquired goodwill recognized under purchase is subject to periodic impairment tests 
                                                 
30 Examples include: impairment of long-lived assets (SFAS 121 in 1995 and SFAS 144 in 2001), 
employee stock options (SFAS 123 in 1995 and SFAS 123R in 2005), derivatives and hedging (SFAS 133 
in 1998), and acquired goodwill (SFAS 142 in 2001).   30
based on unverifiable fair-value estimates of goodwill.  
Results in this paper are consistent with SFAS 142 impairment tests being due in 
part to firms opposed to abolishing pooling (pro-poolers). If the FASB and SEC are 
correct about pooling abuse, and if such abusers are among pro-poolers, it is likely that 
some potential for opportunism has been retained in SFAS 142 impairment tests. I find 
that firms’ lobbying support for SFAS 142 impairment tests increases in their discretion 
potential under the tests. Agency theory suggests such discretion potential can be used 
opportunistically. Thus, the results are consistent with unverifiable fair values in SFAS 
142 impairment generating costs, at least among some lobbying firms.  
Future work can investigate the behavior of lobbying firms post-SFAS 142. 
Figure 3 provides some preliminary evidence to this effect. The figure shows that 
although pro-unverifiable-fair-value firms have seen declines in Abn.MTB through 2004, 
their intangibles have continued to rise. If declining Abn.MTB indicates declining growth 
options and rising intangibles indicate new acquisitions, the evidence suggests that pro-
unverifiable-fair-value firms are making poor acquisitions. Despite this, the figure shows 
that (with the exception of transition-period write-offs) impairments by these firms are 
rare. This result is consistent with pro-unverifiable-fair-value firms successfully 
managing impairments post-SFAS 142.  
  Another avenue for future research is to look at political events prior to the 
issuance of the FASB’s first ED on business combinations (where I begin my study). 
This original ED (#201), issued in September 1999, was predated by a December 1998 
G4+1 position paper.
31 Like ED 201, the G4+1 position paper proposed purchase with 
amortization as the only allowable business-combinations method. The position paper 
was exposed to comment in the US. An FASB analysis of these comments concluded that 
while academics, public accountants, and some industrial firms supported the G4+1 
conclusions, banks, securities firms, and other industrial firms opposed the conclusions. 
Future work can analyze firm responses to the G4+1 paper for their effect on the FASB. 
Since ED 201 is similar in substance to the G4+1 paper, it does not appear that opposition 
to the position paper substantially changed the FASB’s position (the change only came in 
                                                 
31 The G4+1 is a working group of standard setters from Canada, New Zealand, the UK, the US, and the 
IASC. Its position papers are not binding on its members.    31
the FASB’s second exposure draft, after Congress became involved). Nevertheless, a 
study of the G4+1 comments can shed light on the agenda-setting process.  
Other agenda-setting questions that can be studied in greater detail include: (1) 
why the FASB finally added business combinations to its agenda in 1996 after nearly six 
years of it topping the FASAC’s list of potential FASB projects (Leftwich 1995); and (2) 
what forces influenced the FASB’s initial position on business combinations accounting.   32
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Appendix 1 
Comparing Financials under different Business Combinations Standards: Pooling, 
Purchase with Amortization, and Purchase with Impairment 
 
Pooling and Purchase are two distinct methods to account for business combinations. 
Goodwill (the excess of purchase price over fair values of net assets acquired) is recorded 
under Purchase, but not under Pooling. Goodwill Amortization is the annual expensing 
of predetermined fractions of goodwill (e.g., 1/n
th of goodwill’s book value is amortized 
over n years). Goodwill Impairment Testing is the periodic assessment of goodwill’s 
current value: if this current (fair) value estimate is less than goodwill’s historical (book) 
value, the difference is expensed as an “impairment.” 
 
Consider the following example. Acquirer (A) buys 100% of Target (T) for $2000 in 
stock. For simplicity, both A and T have one business unit each. Financials of A and T 
are given below. 
 
 
 
Assets 
Liabilities 
Owners’ Equity 
A (Book Value) 
1500 
500
1000
T (Book Value) 
1000 
500
500
T (Fair Value) 
1200 
500
NA
* 
* Not Applicable 
 
Under Pooling: No goodwill is recorded. Assets/Liabilities of the combined firm are 
simply the sum of book values of Assets/Liabilities of A and T. In this simple example, 
Owners’ Equity of the combined firm is simply the sum of Owners’ Equity of A and T.  
 
Under Purchase: Goodwill is calculated as follows.  
Goodwill   = Purchase Price – (Fair Value of Assets – Fair Value of Liabilities)  
= 2000 – (1200 – 500)  
= 1300 
Assets/Liabilities of the combined firm is the sum of book values of Assets/Liabilities of 
A and fair values of Assets/Liabilities of T. Owners’ Equity of the combined firm is the 
sum of Owners’ Equity of A and $2000 stock issued for buying T.  
 
The balance sheet of the combined firm immediately after the acquisition under the 
different methods is given below. 
 
 
 
 
Assets 
Goodwill 
Liabilities 
Owners’ Equity 
 
Net Assets 
Pooling 
2500 
NA 
1000
1500
 
1500 
Purchase with 
Amortization 
 
2700 
1300 
1000
3000
 
3000 
Purchase with 
Impairment 
 
2700 
1300 
1000
3000
 
3000   36
 
Assume that in the following year, the combined firm generates $500 in pre-goodwill 
income. The income statement of the combined firm under different methods is given 
below. 
 
 
 
 
 
Income before G/w 
Goodwill Charges 
 
Net Income 
Pooling 
 
500 
NA
 
500 
Purchase with 
Amortization 
 
Assume 10-yr straight-line*  
500 
130
 
370 
Purchase with 
Impairment 
 
Assume no write-off 
500 
0
 
500 
* i.e., Annual Goodwill Expense = 1300÷10 = 130 
 
Note that Pooling generates high Net Income but low Net Assets; Purchase with 
Amortization generates low Net Income but high Net Assets; Purchase with Impairment 
generates high Net Income and high Net Assets. 
 
Prior to SFAS 141/142, firms were required to use Purchase with Amortization unless 
they met certain criteria to qualify for Pooling. In its original proposal, the FASB 
considered eliminating Pooling and requiring Purchase with Amortization for all 
acquisitions. In its revised proposal (and in the final standards, SFAS 141/142) the FASB 
eliminated Pooling and required Purchase with Impairment for all acquisitions.    37
Appendix 2 
High reporting-unit FTB ratios and the Comment Letter Position  
 
Supporters of the Comment Letter Position advocated using book values in impairment 
tests in either of two ways: (1) defining the fair value of a unit’s goodwill as the 
difference between the unit’s total fair value and the book value of its net assets 
(excluding goodwill); (2) recognizing an impairment loss in a unit only when the 
undiscounted sum of its future cash flows is less than the book value of its net assets.  
 
Note that alternative (1) likely overstates the fair value of goodwill for units with high 
Fair-value-to-Book-value (FTB) ratios (particularly when the book values of assets other 
than goodwill are understated). Since impairment losses are recognized only when the 
fair value of goodwill is less than book goodwill, this proposal makes timely impairment 
losses less likely for units with high FTB ratios. Alternative (2) also makes timely 
impairment losses less likely for high FTB ratio units. To see this, simply note that if a 
unit’s undiscounted future cash-flows is less than its book value (the condition for an 
impairment loss), then its discounted future cash flows (i.e. market value) will also be 
less than its book value. Alternatives (1) and (2) taken together, suggest that the 
Comment Letter Position makes timely impairment losses less likely for units with high 
FTB ratios.  
 
To see this with an example, consider a single reporting-unit firm (company T) that 
advanced proposal (1). Let T’s market value be $100. Let the book value of its net assets 
(excluding goodwill) be $40, and the market value of these assets be $75. Goodwill is 
recorded on the books at $35. Under ED 201-R, the firm’s implied fair value of goodwill 
is $100 - $75, or $25. Impairment loss is $35 - $25, or $10. Under the method proposed 
by company T, however, implied fair value of goodwill is $100 - $40, or $60. There is no 
impairment loss because this implied goodwill value is greater than its book value ($35). 
Now assume that company T advanced proposal (2). T’s market value ($100) is the 
discounted sum of its FCF, thus the undiscounted sum can only be greater than $100. T 
would not face an impairment loss because its book value is $75 (i.e. $40 + $35). 
 
Thus, I expect lobbying firms with high reporting-unit FTB ratios are more likely to 
support the Comment Letter Position.   38
Appendix 3 
Two-level multinomial logit for the Decision to Lobby and Lobbying Positions 
 
The two sets of decisions firms face on ED 201-R are represented in the tree below.  
 
 
 
Level 1 (the higher level) is the decision made by all firms on whether to lobby or not. 
The utility from lobbying is represented as U1, while the utility from not lobbying is 
normalized to zero. Thus, a firm chooses to lobby, i.e.  1 1 = Y , when U1 > 0.  
 
Level 2 (the lower level) is the position adopted by those firms that lobby. Firms support 
either (1) the Amortization Position ( 1 2 = Y ), (2) the Revised ED Position ( 2 2 = Y ), or (3) 
the Comment Letter Position ( 3 2 = Y ). U21, U22, and U23 represent the utilities to firms 
from lobbying on these three positions, respectively. Thus, for example, a firms lobbies 
for amortization, i.e.  1 2 = Y , when U1 > 0, U21 > U22, and U21 > U23.  
 
I model the decision in level 1 using binary logit, and the decision in level 2 using three-
choice multinomial logit. In level 2, I use the Comment Letter Position as the base 
position. Thus, parameter estimates in level 2 must be interpreted as affecting the choice 
of Revised ED Position / Amortization Position over Comment Letter Position. I use a 
nested logit structure to link the two levels.  
 
Thus, for example, 
Pr[ 1 1 = Y ] = 
) * * exp( 1
) * * exp(
1
1
L L L
L L L
I X
I X
α β
α β
+ +
+
,  
 
Comment Letter 
Position 
U1  > 0 &  
U23 > U21 &  
U23 > U22 
Don’t Lobby 
Y1 = 0 
Lobby 
Y1 = 1 
U1 ≤ 0 
Revised ED 
Position  
U1  > 0 &  
U22 > U21 &  
U22 > U23 
Amortization 
Position 
U1  > 0 &  
U21 > U22 &  
U21 > U23 
Y2 = 3 
Y2 = 2
Y2 = 1  39
Pr[ 1 2 = Y  |  1 1 = Y ] = 
) * exp( ) * exp( 1
) * exp(
Re 2 2
2
CL v CL AM
CL AM
X X
X
− −
−
+ + β β
β
, and 
 
Pr[ 1 1 = Y  &  1 2 = Y ] = Pr[ 1 1 = Y ] * Pr[ 1 2 = Y  |  1 1 = Y ].  
 
Where,  
(1)  L α  is the Inclusive Value Parameter in level 1 to account for the correlation between 
decisions:  L α  = 1 Ù no correlation, and  L α  = 0 Ù perfect correlation;  
 
(2)  L I  = ln[  ) * exp( ) * exp( 1 Re 2 2 CL v CL AM X X − − + + β β  ]; and  
 
(3) for each lobbying firm,  2 X  and  1 X  are vectors of explanatory variables for lobbying 
positions and decisions, respectively. 
 
For the two-level multinomial logit described above, I use full-information maximum 
likelihood estimation to recover parameter values, while standard errors are the roots of 
diagonal elements of the inverse Hessian.   40
Appendix 4 
Median Discretion Proxies across Lobbying Positions 
 
    
Original Proposal (201) 
 
    
Anti-Pooling Pro-Pooling Didn't  Lobby  Total 
N 5  5  28  38 
Ln(Seg)*Ln(Sales)  15.924  14.271  15.453   
Ln(Seg)  1.609  1.386  1.792   
Abn.MtB  0.673 0.297 -0.858  
MtB  3.952 2.058  1.896   
UNA  -0.120  -0.248  0.497   
Mod.UNA  -0.120  -0.248  0.507   
Amortization 
Position 
Abn.ItA  -0.004 -0.009 -0.069   
N 8  8  35  51 
Ln(Seg)*Ln(Sales)  13.204  17.164  12.396   
Ln(Seg)  1.792  1.792  1.609   
Abn.MtB  -0.190 3.525  0.055   
MtB  1.859 6.249  2.832   
UNA  0.209  -0.039  0.851   
Mod.UNA  0.209  0.156  0.687   
Revised ED 
Position 
Abn.ItA  -0.013 0.017  0.027   
N 8  18  19  45 
Ln(Seg)*Ln(Sales)  17.375  18.129  17.069   
Ln(Seg)  1.869  1.869  1.792   
Abn.MtB  0.005 2.024  1.155   
MtB  2.983 4.601  3.132   
UNA  0.465  0.487  0.403   
Mod.UNA  0.465  0.487  0.403   
Comment Letter 
Position 
Abn.ItA  0.055 -0.009 0.075   
N 21  31    
Ln(Seg)*Ln(Sales)  12.309  11.748    
Ln(Seg)  1.386  1.609    
Abn.MtB  -0.551 0.146     
MtB  2.301 2.467     
UNA  0.309  -0.141    
Mod.UNA  0.309  0.054    
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Didn't Lobby 
Abn.ItA  0.005 -0.015     
 
Total   42 62 
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Variable Definitions 
Support for the Amortization Position indicates support for continued goodwill 
amortization (i.e. opposition to the ED’s impairment approach). Support for the Revised 
ED Position indicates support for both goodwill impairment and the ED’s testing 
methodology. Under this methodology, a reporting-units’ fair value of goodwill is the 
difference between the unit’s total fair value and the fair value of its net assets. Support 
for the Comment Letter Position indicates support for goodwill impairment, but 
opposition to the testing methodology. Instead, these managers proposed tests based on 
the book values of net assets in reporting units. Ln(Seg)*Ln(Sales) is the product of the 
natural logs of the number of business segments in a firm and the firm’s sales. Ln(Seg) is 
the natural log of the number of business segments in a firm. Abn.MtB is the excess of a 
firm’s Market-to-Book over its size-industry’s average Market-to-Book. MtB is the firm’s 
Market-to-Book ratio. UNA is a measure of the unverifiability of net assets, calculated as 
-1*[Cash + Investments – Debt – Preferred Equity] / [Assets – Liabilities]. Mod.UNA is a 
modified measure of the unverifiability of net assets, calculated as | (1 - |UNA|) |. Abn.ItA 
is the excess of a firm’s Intangibles-to-Assets over its size-industry’s average Intangibles-
to-Assets. In the definitions above, a firm’s “size-industry” peer-group is all 
COMPUSTAT observations sharing its sales-quartile rank and its two-digit NAICS code. 
For a firm, the “size-industry average” value of a given variable is the sales-weighted 
mean value of that variable within the firm’s “size-industry.” All ratios are winsorized at 
the 5
th and 95
th percentile of size-industry values. Results are robust to various alternate 
definitions of “size-industry” and “size-industry average,” and to winsorizing at the 1
st 
and 99
th percentiles: see the text. 
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Table 1: Summary of Hypotheses 
 
Motivation No.  Hypothesis  Empirical  Proxies  Pred. 
Sign 
H1a 
Prob. that a Congressperson selects into the set pressuring the 
FASB over pooling increases in PAC contributions received 
from pro-pooling firms and industry groups. 
$ from pro-pooling PACs / Total PAC receipts & 
$ from pro-pooling PACs / Total receipts  + 
Is goodwill impairment 
in SFAS 142 due in part 
to pro-poolers? 
H1b 
Prob. that a firm supports the Comment Letter Position over 
the Amortization Position/ Revised ED Position increases 
with the firm's support for pooling. 
AM - CL Pro-Pooling 
Rev - CL Pro-Pooling  - 
H2a 
Prob. that a firm supports the Comment Letter Position over 
the Amortization Position/ Revised ED Position increases 
with the number and size of its reporting-units. 
AM - CL Ln(Seg)*Ln(Sales) & Ln(Seg) 
Rev - CL Ln(Seg)*Ln(Sales) & Ln(Seg)  - 
H2b 
Prob. that a firm supports the Comment Letter Position over 
the Amortization Position increases with its reporting-units’ 
FTB ratios. 
AM - CL Abn.MtB & MtB - 
H2c 
Prob. that a firm supports the Comment Letter Position over 
the Revised ED Position increases with the verifiability of its 
net assets. 
Rev - CL UNA & Mod.UNA. + 
Does discretion 
potential explain firms’ 
support for goodwill 
impairment? 
H2d 
Prob. that a firm supports the Comment Letter Position over 
the Amortization Position increases with its abnormal 
goodwill-to-assets. 
AM - CL Abn.ItA - 
 
  Prob. that a firm lobbies increases with firm size  Ln(Sales)  + 
  Prob. that a firm lobbies increases with the absolute value of 
abnormal goodwill-to-assets  |Abn.ItA|  + 
Controls for the self-
selection of lobbying 
firms 
  Prob. that a firm lobbies increases with debt contract, 
compensation contract, and stock pricing concerns  Debt/Asst. & Bonus/Comp. & ERC  + 
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Variable Definitions 
PAC is Political Action Committee. “$ from pro-pooling PACs / Total PAC receipts” is the ratio of a Congressperson’s PAC receipts 
from pro-pooling PACs to her/his receipts from all PACs. “$ from pro-pooling PACs / Total receipts” is the ratio of a 
Congressperson’s PAC receipts from pro-pooling PACs to her/his receipts from all sources (including PACs). AM, Rev and CL refer 
to the Amortization Position, Revised ED Position, and Comment Letter Position, respectively. When a variable is prefixed with AM - 
CL (Rev - CL), then the effect of that variable on the choice of Amortization Position (Revised ED Position) over Comment Letter 
Position is being measured. Pro-Pooling is a dummy set to “1” if the firm lobbied for pooling on ED 201 (Original Proposal), “0” 
otherwise. Ln(Seg)*Ln(Sales) is the product of the natural logs of the number of business segments in a firm and the firm’s sales. 
Ln(Seg) is the natural log of the number of business segments in a firm. Abn.MtB is the excess of a firm’s Market-to-Book over its 
size-industry’s average Market-to-Book. MtB is the firm’s Market-to-Book ratio. UNA is a measure of the unverifiability of net assets, 
calculated as -1*[Cash + Investments – Debt – Preferred Equity] / [Assets – Liabilities]. Mod.UNA is a modified measure of the 
unverifiability of net assets, calculated as | (1 - |UNA|) |. Abn.ItA is the excess of a firm’s Intangibles-to-Assets over its size-industry’s 
average Intangibles-to-Assets. Ln(Sales) is the log of a firm’s sales. |Abn.ItA| is the absolute value of Abn.ItA. Debt/Asst. is the ratio of 
debt to assets.  Bonus/Comp. is the ratio of CEO Bonus to total Cash Compensation. ERC is the coefficient from regressing a firm’s 
price on its operating income using at least 16 and up to 20 quarters of data prior to ED 201-R (Revised Proposal). In the definitions 
above, a firm’s “size-industry” peer-group is all COMPUSTAT observations sharing its sales-quartile rank and its two-digit NAICS 
code. For a firm, the “size-industry average” value of a given variable is the sales-weighted mean value of that variable within the 
firm’s “size-industry.” Results are robust to various alternate definitions of “size-industry” and “size-industry average:” see the text.   44
Table 2 
Univariate Test of H1a: Benchmarking Contributions from Pro-Pooling PACs to Pro-Pooling Congresspersons 
 
 
    Mean    Median 
 
    Pro-Pooling 
Congresspersons
Other 
Congresspersons
  Pro-Pooling 
Congresspersons 
Other 
Congresspersons 
 
 
 
$ from anti-pooling PACs / 
Total PAC receipts  4.84 %
 + 3.43  %
 # 
 
4.39 %
 + 3.00  %
 # 
 
 
 
$ from pro-pooling PACs / 
Total PAC receipts  13.36 %  8.86 %
 * 
 
14.47 %  8.28 %
 * 
 
 
 
$ from anti-pooling PACs / 
Total receipts  1.88 %
 + 1.53  %
 # 
 
1.55 %
 + 1.20  %
 # 
 
 
 
$ from pro-pooling PACs / 
Total receipts  5.77 %  3.89 %
 * 
 
5.72 %  3.16 %
 * 
 
For means (medians), *, +, and #  indicate that contributions from pro-pooling PACs to pro-pooling Congresspersons are statistically 
greater at the 95% confidence level than contributions from: (i) pro-pooling PACs to other Congresspersons; (ii) anti-pooling PACs to 
pro-pooling Congresspersons; and (iii) anti-pooling PACs to other Congresspersons, respectively, using a two-sided t test (Wilcoxan 
two-sample test).  
 
Pro-Pooling Congresspersons are those Congresspersons who took a pro-pooling position in at least one of the political events 
identified in the text. Other Congresspersons are all other members of the 106
th Congress (1999-2000). PAC is Political Action 
Committee. Pro- and anti-pooling PACs are the PACs of firms and industry groups taking pro- and anti-pooling positions, 
respectively, on ED 201 (Original Proposal). “$ from pro-pooling PACs / Total PAC receipts” is the ratio of a Congressperson’s PAC 
receipts from pro-pooling PACs to her/his receipts from all PACs. “$ from pro-pooling PACs / Total receipts” is the ratio of a 
Congressperson’s PAC receipts from pro-pooling PACs to her/his receipts from all sources (including PACs). Similar definitions 
apply for “$ from anti-pooling PACs / Total PAC receipts” and “$ from anti-pooling PACs / Total receipts.”   45
Table 3 
Multivariate Test of H1a: Probit Regression to explain Congresspersons’ Pro-Pooling Activity with Contributions from Pro-
Pooling PACs (Recursive Estimation with a Model for the Determinants of Pro-pooling PAC Contributions) 
 
     (A)   (B) 
 
 
Predicted 
Sign 
Estimate 
   
Standard 
Error   
Estimate 
   
Standard 
Error 
  Control Equation: Dependent Variable for A (B) is: $ from pro-pooling PACs / Total PAC receipts (Total receipts) 
  Intercept    0.058  ***  0.007    -0.018    0.015 
  Ideology1    0.094  ***  0.013    0.073  ***  0.016 
  Ideology2    0.006    0.015    0.040  **  0.017 
  Committee Membership Dummy    0.066  ***  0.012    0.052  ***  0.014 
  Sigma    0.071  ***  0.004    0.056  ***  0.005 
                 
  Probit Equation: Dependent Variable is “1” if Congressperson supported pooling, “0” otherwise 
  Intercept    -2.095  ***  0.164   -2.002  ***  0.176 
  $ from anti-pooling PACs / Total PAC receipts    3.144    2.700        
  $ from pro-pooling PACs / Total PAC receipts  +  0.559  ***  0.123         
  $ from anti-pooling PACs / Total receipts            -6.881    7.259 
  $ from pro-pooling PACs / Total receipts  +          1.238  **  0.593 
  Ideology1    -0.027    0.266    0.136    0.322 
  Ideology2    -0.786  **  0.347    -0.677  *  0.380 
  Committee Membership Dummy    1.674  ***  0.214    1.869  ***  0.235 
  Rho    0.173    0.108    0.225    0.180 
                 
  Log likelihood    680       1016    
  No. of Observations    498       498    
 
***, **, and * indicate significance at the 99%, 95%, and 90% one-tail confidence level, respectively.   46
 
Variable Definitions 
Pro-Pooling Congresspersons (Dependent Variable = 1 in the Probit Regression) are those Congresspersons who took a pro-pooling 
position in at least one of the political events identified in the text. Other Congresspersons are all other members of the 106
th Congress 
(1999-2000). PAC is Political Action Committee. Pro- and anti-pooling PACs are the PACs of firms and industry groups taking pro- 
and anti-pooling positions, respectively, on ED 201 (Original Proposal). “$ from pro-pooling PACs / Total PAC receipts” is the ratio 
of a Congressperson’s PAC receipts from pro-pooling PACs to her/his receipts from all PACs. “$ from pro-pooling PACs / Total 
receipts” is the ratio of a Congressperson’s PAC receipts from pro-pooling PACs to her/his receipts from all sources (including 
PACs). Similar definitions apply for “$ from anti-pooling PACs / Total PAC receipts” and “$ from anti-pooling PACs / Total 
receipts.” Ideology1 and Ideology2 are the two dimensions of Congresspersons’ ideologies (Common Space Scores) described in 
Poole (1998). Committee Membership Dummy is “1” for Congresspersons who are members of the House Finance Subcommittee/ 
Senate Banking Committee. Sigma is the estimated standard deviation of the error term in the control equation (required for 
identification because the dependent variable in this equation is truncated). Rho is the estimated correlation between the error terms of 
the control and probit equations.  
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Table 4 
Distribution of Firms across Lobbying Positions 
 
  
Original Proposal (201) 
 
  
Anti-
Pooling  Pro-Pooling Didn't  Lobby  Total 
Amortization 
Position  5 5  28  38 
Revised ED  
Position  8 8  35  51 
Comment Letter 
Position  8 18  19 45 
R
e
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Didn't Lobby  21 31    
 
Total  42 62 
  
 
Support for the Amortization Position indicates support for continued goodwill 
amortization (i.e. opposition to the ED’s impairment approach). Support for the Revised 
ED Position indicates support for both goodwill impairment and the ED’s testing 
methodology. Under this methodology, a reporting-units’ fair value of goodwill is the 
difference between the unit’s total fair value and the fair value of its net assets. Support 
for the Comment Letter Position indicates support for goodwill impairment, but 
opposition to the testing methodology. Instead, these managers proposed tests based on 
the book values of net assets in reporting units.    48
Table 5A 
Univariate Test of H1b and H2: Discretion Proxies across Lobbying Positions on ED 201-R (Revised Proposal) 
 
    Means   
  Medians 
   
Amortization 
Position 
N=30 
Revised ED 
Position 
N=42 
Comment 
Letter Position
N=43 
 
 
Amortization 
Position 
N=30 
Revised ED 
Position 
N=42 
Comment 
Letter Position
N=43 
Ln(Seg)*Ln(Sales)  15.781  13.789  17.030   
  15.688  12.804  17.562 
H2a 
Ln(Seg)  1.722  1.544  1.775   
  1.792  1.609  1.792 
Abn.MtB  0.251  1.455 2.756   
  -0.725  -0.097 1.321 
H2b 
MtB  3.096  4.212 5.487   
  2.195  2.874 3.715 
UNA  0.454  1.095  0.120   
  0.352  0.769  0.447 
H2c 
Mod.UNA  0.454  1.290  0.240   
  0.352  0.655  0.447 
H2d  Abn.ItA  -0.018  0.061 0.049   
  -0.039  0.027 0.012 
H1b  Pro-Pooling  13%  17%  40%   
     
  Oppsd.Ind.Assn.  87%  2% 63%   
     
 
For means (medians), bold figures in the Amortization Position and Revised ED Position columns are significantly different at the 
95% confidence level from corresponding figures in the Comment Letter Position column using a one-sided t test (Wilcoxan two-
sample test).    49
 
Variable Definitions 
Support for the Amortization Position indicates support for continued goodwill amortization (i.e. opposition to the ED’s impairment 
approach). Support for the Revised ED Position indicates support for both goodwill impairment and the ED’s testing methodology. 
Under this methodology, a reporting-units’ fair value of goodwill is the difference between the unit’s total fair value and the fair value 
of its net assets. Support for the Comment Letter Position indicates support for goodwill impairment, but opposition to the testing 
methodology. Instead, these managers proposed tests based on the book values of net assets in reporting units. Ln(Seg)*Ln(Sales) is 
the product of the natural logs of the number of business segments in a firm and the firm’s sales. Ln(Seg) is the natural log of the 
number of business segments in a firm. Abn.MtB is the excess of a firm’s Market-to-Book over its size-industry’s average Market-to-
Book. MtB is the firm’s Market-to-Book ratio. UNA is a measure of the unverifiability of net assets, calculated as -1*[Cash + 
Investments – Debt – Preferred Equity] / [Assets – Liabilities]. Mod.UNA is a modified measure of the unverifiability of net assets, 
calculated as | (1 - |UNA|) |. Abn.ItA is the excess of a firm’s Intangibles-to-Assets over its size-industry’s average Intangibles-to-
Assets. Pro-Pooling is a dummy set to “1” if the firm lobbied for pooling on ED 201 (Original Proposal), “0” otherwise. 
Oppsd.Ind.Assn is a dummy set to “1” if the firm’s industry association took a position different from that of the firm, “0” otherwise. 
In the definitions above, a firm’s “size-industry” peer-group is all COMPUSTAT observations sharing its sales-quartile rank and its 
two-digit NAICS code. For a firm, the “size-industry average” value of a given variable is the sales-weighted mean value of that 
variable within the firm’s “size-industry.” All ratios are winsorized at the 5
th and 95
th percentile of size-industry values. Results are 
robust to various alternate definitions of “size-industry” and “size-industry average,” and to winsorizing at the 1
st and 99
th percentiles: 
see the text.  50
Table 5B 
Descriptive Statistics for Lobbyists v. Non-Lobbyists on ED 201-R (Revised Proposal) 
 
 
  Mean   
  Median   N 
  Non-Lobbying 
Firms 
Lobbying 
Firms 
 
 
Non-Lobbying 
Firms 
Lobbying 
Firms    Non-Lobbying 
Firms 
Lobbying 
Firms 
Ln(Sales)  4.403  9.079   
  4.393  9.262  8797  115 
|Abn.ItA|  0.095 0.103   
  0.066 0.075    8797 115 
Debt/Asst.  0.363 0.391   
  0.279  0.286  8797  113 
Bonus/Comp.  0.359  0.523   
  0.395  0.560  1658  98 
ERC  17.979  25.079   
  9.186  18.960  3743  94 
Lobb.Orig.ED  <1%  42%   
       8797  115 
 
For means (medians), bold figures in the Non-Lobbying Firms column are significantly different at the 95% confidence level from 
corresponding figures in the Lobbying Firms column using a one-sided t test (Wilcoxan two-sample test).  
 
Ln(Sales) is the log of a firm’s sales. |Abn.ItA| is absolute value of the excess of a firm’s Intangibles-to-Assets over its size-industry’s 
Intangibles-to-Assets. Debt/Asst. is the ratio of debt to assets.  Bonus/Comp. is the ratio of CEO Bonus to total Cash Compensation. 
ERC is the coefficient from regressing a firm’s price on its operating income using at least 16 and up to 20 quarters of data prior to ED 
201-R. Lobb.Orig.ED is a dummy set to “1” if the firm filed a comment letter on ED 201, “0” otherwise. In the definitions above, a 
firm’s “size-industry” peer-group is all COMPUSTAT observations sharing its sales-quartile rank and its two-digit NAICS code. For a 
firm, the “size-industry average” value of a given variable is the sales-weighted mean value of that variable within the firm’s “size-
industry.” All ratios are winsorized at the 5
th and 95
th percentile of size-industry values. Results are robust to various alternate 
definitions of “size-industry” and “size-industry average,” and to winsorizing at the 1
st and 99
th percentiles: see the text.  51
Table 5C 
Distribution of Firms by Industry and Lobbying Positions on ED 201-R (Revised Proposal) 
 
   Revised ED (201-R) 
  
Amortization 
Position 
Revised ED 
Position 
Comment 
Letter Position  Total 
Finance and Insurance    8  15  12  35 
Information    3 4 3  10 
Manufacturing    19 18 21  58 
Trade    3 3 1  7 
Transport  and  Storage    0 4 0  4 
Utilities    2 1 4  7 
Other  Services    3 4 3  10 
All  Other    0 2 1  3 
Total    38 51 45  134 
         
   Table P  Prob. <= P     
Fisher's Exact Test    9.16E-10 0.6209     
(Freeman-Halton)         
 
Smaller p-values support the alternative hypothesis of association between row and column variables. 
 
See Table 5A for a description of the positions.   52
Table 6A 
Multivariate Test of H1b and H2: Two-level Nested Multinomial Logit to Explain 
Firms’ Lobbying Decisions and Lobbying Positions 
 
Figures in the table are t-statistics. 
    Predicted  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Intercept      -12.728 -13.460 -12.726 -12.769 -10.143  -8.554 
Ln(Sales)  +    8.336 7.966 8.321 8.351 7.613 5.665 
|Abn.ItA|  +    1.279 1.079 1.279 1.254 0.075  -0.249 
Debt/Asst.  +    . . . .  -0.484  -0.540 
Bonus/Comp.  +    . . . . .  2.292 
ERC  +    . . . .  0.843  0.471 
L
e
v
e
l
 
1
 
Lobb.Orig.ED      9.066 9.347 9.069 9.015 8.246 7.708 
Intercept      5.757 3.641 6.021 5.634 4.012 3.638 
Ln(Seg)*Ln(Sales)  -  -4.699  .  -4.649  -4.620  -3.898  -3.495 
Ln(Seg)  - 
H2a 
.  -2.640  .  .  .  . 
Abn.MtB  -  -2.852 -2.902  . -2.885 -2.309 -1.199 
MtB  - 
H2b 
. .  -2.765 . . . 
UNA  NS  1.362  0.900  1.380  .  1.220  1.778 
Mod.UNA  NS 
H2c 
.  .  .  1.012  .  . 
Abn.ItA  -  H2d  -2.766 -2.146 -2.851 -2.713 -3.106 -2.077 
Pro-Pooling  -  H1b  -4.048  -4.240  -4.155  -4.019  -2.645  -2.486 
L
e
v
e
l
 
2
:
 
A
M
 
–
 
C
L
 
Oppsd.Ind.Assn       2.044 2.162 2.136 2.228 1.517 0.709 
Intercept      7.367 5.076 6.898 7.262 6.457 6.145 
Ln(Seg)*Ln(Sales)  -  -4.677  .  -4.676  -4.556  -4.183  -4.060 
Ln(Seg)  - 
H2a 
.  -2.968  .  .  .  . 
Abn.MtB  NS  0.549 0.559  . 0.414 0.601 0.772 
MtB  NS 
H2b 
. .  0.949 . . . 
UNA  +  3.746  3.364  3.755  .  3.714  3.810 
Mod.UNA  + 
H2c 
.  .  .  3.530  .  . 
Abn.ItA  NS  H2d -0.622 0.639  -0.538  -0.427 0.207 0.073 
Pro-Pooling  -  H1b  -3.483  -3.963  -3.694  -3.468  -3.313  -3.239 
L
e
v
e
l
 
2
:
 
R
e
v
 
–
 
C
L
 
Oppsd.Ind.Assn      -4.183 -4.292 -4.113 -4.207 -4.484 -4.462 
               
  Inclusive  Value  Estimate 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 
  Pseudo  R2 0.708 0.692 0.708 0.706 0.687 0.627 
  Level  1  No.  of  Obs. 8912 8912 8912 8912 3835 1435 
  Level 2 No. of Obs.  115  115  115  115  92  86 
 
This table presents the results of tests of H1b and H2. The determinants of firms’ 
lobbying positions (level 2) are modeled using a multinomial logit, while firms’ lobbying 
decisions (level 1) are modeled using a binary logit. Y1, the dependent variable in level 1, 
is “1” if a firm lobbies on the ED 201-R (revised proposal), and “0” if it does not. Y2, the 
dependent variable in H2 is “1” if the firm supports the Amortization Position, “2” if the 
firm supports the Revised ED Position, and “3” if the firm supports the Comment Letter 
Position.    53
 
Variable Definitions 
Level 1: Ln(Sales) is the log of a firm’s sales. |Abn.ItA| is absolute value of the excess of 
a firm’s Intangibles-to-Assets over its size-industry’s Intangibles-to-Assets. Debt/Asst. is 
the ratio of debt to assets.  Bonus/Comp. is the ratio of CEO Bonus to total Cash 
Compensation. ERC is the coefficient from regressing a firm’s price on its operating 
income using at least 16 and up to 20 quarters of data prior to ED 201-R. Lobb.Orig.ED 
is a dummy set to “1” if the firm filed a comment letter on ED 201, “0” otherwise. 
 
Level 2: AM, Rev and CL refer to the Amortization Position, Revised ED Position, and 
Comment Letter Position, respectively. When a variable is prefixed with AM - CL (Rev - 
CL), then the effect of that variable on the choice of Amortization Position (Revised ED 
Position) over Comment Letter Position is being measured. Ln(Seg)*Ln(Sales) is the 
product of the natural logs of the number of business segments in a firm and the firm’s 
sales. Ln(Seg) is the natural log of the number of business segments in a firm. Abn.MtB is 
the excess of a firm’s Market-to-Book over its size-industry’s average Market-to-Book. 
MtB is the firm’s Market-to-Book ratio. UNA is a measure of the unverifiability of net 
assets, calculated as -1*[Cash + Investments – Debt – Preferred Equity] / [Assets – 
Liabilities]. Mod.UNA is a modified measure of the unverifiability of net assets, 
calculated as | (1 - |UNA|) |. Abn.ItA is the excess of a firm’s Intangibles-to-Assets over its 
size-industry’s average Intangibles-to-Assets. Pro-Pooling is a dummy set to “1” if the 
firm lobbied for pooling on ED 201 (Original Proposal), “0” otherwise. Oppsd.Ind.Assn 
is a dummy set to “1” if the firm’s industry association took a position different from that 
of the firm, “0” otherwise.  
 
In the definitions above, a firm’s “size-industry” peer-group is all COMPUSTAT 
observations sharing its sales-quartile rank and its two-digit NAICS code. For a firm, the 
“size-industry average” value of a given variable is the sales-weighted mean value of that 
variable within the firm’s “size-industry.” All ratios are winsorized at the 5
th and 95
th 
percentile of size-industry values. Results are robust to various alternate definitions of 
“size-industry” and “size-industry average,” and to winsorizing at the 1
st and 99
th 
percentiles: see the text. Inclusive Value accounts for the correlation between the two 
levels: see Appendix 3.  54
Table 6B 
Marginal Effects of Independent Variables in Table 6A 
 
Figures in the table are percentage changes in outcome probabilities. 
    Predicted  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Δ Pr[Y1 = 0]; independent variables at 90
th percentile        
Ln(Sales)  -   -6.1 -6.5 -5.8 -5.9 -5.0  -16.4 
|Abn.ItA|  -   -3.3 -2.8 -3.1 -3.1 -0.2  1.8 
Debt/Asst.  -    . . . .  1.7  4.0 
Bonus/Comp.  -    . . . . .  -12.4 
ERC  -    . . . .  -1.7  -2.9 
L
e
v
e
l
 
1
 
Lobb.Orig.ED     -67.4 -68.6 -67.0 -66.7 -63.3 -63.7 
Δ Pr[Y1 = 1, Y2 = 1]; independent variables at means        
Ln(Seg)*Ln(Sales)  -  -23.5  .  -22.7  -21.9  -11.1  -17.9 
Ln(Seg)  - 
H2a 
.  -11.4  .  .  .  . 
Abn.MtB  -  -12.5 -13.1  .  -12.0 -5.2 -8.5 
MtB  - 
H2b 
. .  -11.7 . . . 
UNA  NS  3.9  2.2  3.9  .  2.1  8.0 
Mod.UNA  NS 
H2c 
.  .  .  2.4  .  . 
Abn.ItA  - H2d  -15.2 -10.7 -15.3 -14.0 -10.7 -16.3 
Pro-Pooling  -  H1b  -10.0  -9.8  -10.0  -9.5  -4.0  -10.9 
L
e
v
e
l
 
2
:
 
A
M
 
-
 
C
L
 
Oppsd.Ind.Assn     10.7 11.3 11.0 11.0  5.0 10.4 
Δ Pr[Y1 = 1, Y2 = 2]; independent variables at means        
Ln(Seg)*Ln(Sales)  -  -23.2  .  -21.7  -22.1  -21.2  -38.6 
Ln(Seg)  - 
H2a 
.  -14.8  .  .  .  . 
Abn.MtB  NS 2.9  3.0  .  2.3 3.0  10.2 
MtB  NS 
H2b 
. .  4.4 . . . 
UNA  +  16.0  15.2  15.2  .  18.8  40.4 
Mod.UNA  + 
H2c 
.  .  .  15.1  .  . 
Abn.ItA  NS  H2d -1.8 3.0  -1.2  -0.9 1.3 3.2 
Pro-Pooling  -  H1b  -9.2  -10.5  -8.9  -8.9  -9.8  -23.7 
L
e
v
e
l
 
2
:
 
R
e
v
 
-
 
C
L
 
Oppsd.Ind.Assn     -37.6 -40.0 -38.3 -36.5 -41.3 -66.4 
            
 
The marginal effect of a continuous variable is the change in outcome probability when 
the continuous variable is increased from one standard deviation below its mean value to 
one standard deviation above its mean value. The marginal effect of a dummy variable is 
the change in outcome probability when the dummy variable is increased from zero to 
one. When calculating the marginal effect of a given variable, all other level 2 variables 
are set to their mean values, while all other level 1 variables are set to their 90
th percentile 
value.  
 
See Table 6A for variable definitions.  
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Figure 1: Hypotheses in the Timeline of Events Leading Up To SFAS 142 
 
 
 
Original 
Proposal 
 (ED 201): 
Abolish 
Pooling, 
Amortize 
Goodwill    
(A) 
Senate 
Hearings   
(B) 
House 
Hearings    
(C) 
Bill in House 
to create 
Intangibles 
Commission  
Revised 
Proposal  
(ED 201-R): 
Abolish 
Pooling, 
Impair 
Goodwill    
SFAS 141/2: 
Abolish 
Pooling, 
Impair 
Goodwill 
(similar to 
Comment 
Letter Pos.) 
  Oct–Dec, '99          Sep,  '00       Mar–Apr, '01     
                  
Sep, '99      Mar, '00    May, '00      Oct, '00    Feb, '01      Jun, ‘01 
                 
  (1) 
Firms Lobby: 
Pro-Pooling 
v.  
Anti-Pooling 
    M o r g a n ,  
Goldman, 
Deloitte, 
PWC, AA 
meet FASB 
over goodwill 
impairment 
 ABC,  Cisco, 
Merrill, 
TechNet meet 
FASB over 
goodwill 
impairment 
(D) 
Letter from 
Senators 
expressing 
"reservations" 
over FASB 
proposal 
   (2) 
Firms Lobby: 
Amortization 
Position 
v.  
Revised ED 
Position  
v.  
Comment 
Letter Pos. 
  
 
 
H1a: Are Congressional positions in (A)–(D) associated with PAC money from pro-poolers in (1)? 
H1b: Are pro-pooling firms from (1) among supporters of the Comment Letter Position in (2)? 
H2a-d: Can lobbying positions in (2) be explained by discretion proxies? 
 
See Table 1 for variable definitions.  56
Figure 2 
Implied Fair Value of Goodwill under the Revised ED Position and the Comment Letter Position 
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Figure 3 
Abnormal MTB, Intangibles, and Impairments post SFAS 142 
 
Amortization Position Firms       Revised ED Position Firms       Comment Letter Position Firms 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 